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INTRODUCTION

Our national conversation about the propriety of affirmative action revolves
around a central question: is it appropriate to consider race in allocating
sought-after benefits and limited resources? The rhetorical positions on each
side of this debate are familiar. Opponents of affirmative action argue that
race-conscious decision-making undercuts traditional notions of merit and
provides less-qualified individuals with access to undeserved benefits. 1
Proponents reply that purportedly neutral notions of merit are socially
constructed and entrench an exclusionary system of benefits distribution.2
Opponents argue that affirmative action unfairly penalizes "innocent"
individuals by requiring them to bear the burdens of redressing harms they did

1
Lino A. Graglia, Professor Loewy 's "Diversity" Defense of Racial Preference:
Defining Discrimination Away, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1505, 1513 (1999) ("Racial preferences are
an attempt to overcome the fact that members of the preferred groups are not, in general,
competitive with whites (and Asians) in terms of the ordinary academic admissions
criteria.").
2
Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia,
1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 752-57 (describing the social construction of merit); Susan Sturm &
Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CALIF.
L. REV. 953, 954-56 (1996) (noting that proponents of affirmative action often challenge the
" fairness and functionality of existing merit standards" because they rely on "exclusionary
criteria").
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not cause. 3
Proponents view affirmative action as providing limited
compensation for age-old injuries caused by a long history of state-mandated
segregation. 4
To a large extent, this debate can be understood as a dispute about the
propriety of viewing the Equal Protection Clause from an individualist rather
than a group-oriented perspective. 5 Thus, the broad question at the heart of
affirmative action cases, and anti-discrimination law generally, is whether the
Equal Protection Clause should protect individuals qua individuals (the
"individualist discriminatory" framework) or whether it should protect
members of minority groups precisely because they are members of minority
groups (the "group rights" or "antisubjugation" position). 6 It is now
abundantly clear that a majority of the current Supreme Court views the Equal
Protection Clause as a font of individual rights protection rather than as a
safeguard for minority group interests. 7 Adhering to this individualist

3

See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 299-308
( 1990) (examining the notion of the "innocent white victim" in the context of the affirmative
action debate). Professor Ross concludes that the "rhetoric of innocence" diverts society
from what he believes is the crucial question: "how do we get to a world where good people,
white and of color, no longer suffer because of the accidental circumstances of their race?"
Id. at 315-16.
4
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 921, 958-97 (1996) (arguing that affirmative action can be justified as a
remedy for present day discrimination and racial disparity in areas such as education,
employment, housing, health care, economic opportunity, crime and poverty).
5 Opponents claim that affirmative action protects group rights at the expense of
individual rights, thereby subverting constitutional norms generally, and the Equal
Protection Clause specifically. Graglia, supra note I, at 1512 (arguing that the use of
affirmative action in college admissions is "inconsistent with the democratic principle of
individual worth"). Alternatively, proponents view the Equal Protection Clause as
emphasizing racial subjugation and racial equality as guiding•themes rather than focusing on
colorblindness and individual rights. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust:
A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1334-37 (1986)
(proposing that the Constitution opposes subjugation, not discrimination, and therefore
would prohibit even race-neutral policies that have the effect of subjugating a certain race).
6 Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1335-36 (maintaining that the interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause as requiring color-blind policies is merely a theory, and summarizing
arguments for and against the "antisubjugation" interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause).
7 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). In the opinion for
the Court in Adarand, Justice O'Connor wrote, "[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution protect persons, not groups." Id. (emphasis in original). This portion of
Justice O'Connor's opinion garnered the support of Justices Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas as
well as Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. In 1976, with a seven vote majority, the Court held
that, absent an "invidious discriminatory purpose," a law is valid under the Fourteenth
Amendment even if it has a disparate impact on minority groups'. See Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229,242 (1976).
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perspective of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has also limited the type
of discrimination that government can redress through an affirmative action
program. Briefly stated, particularized instances of identified discrimination
are "in,"8 and amorphous claims of societal discrimination are "out."9
Given the apparent durability of the Court's individualist position, it would
seem that there is little use in championing an approach that bears even the
slightest relationship to the group rights position. Fidelity to the individualist
discriminatory framework in affirmative action cases, on the other hand,
usually results in invalidation of affirmative action plans. This might be a
positive development if one viewed the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
solely as prohibiting race-based governmental decision-making prospectively.
However, the aftershocks and reverberations of prior racial discrimination are
still felt powerfully today because of "lock-in" effects, 10 particularly in the
areas of housing, education and employment. 11 More economically and
socially powerful groups may engage in anti-competitive conduct that distorts
the market for skills acquisition and enhancement, education, jobs, and
contracting opportunities. 12 Such actions lock-in advantages accrued in a prior
era, lock-out unwanted competitive pressures, and strengthen and perpetuate a
powerful advantage/disadvantage cycle encompassing education, jobs, and
housing opportunitie.s. Thus, even if all decision-makers today were to act
without regard to race, adherence to the individualist discriminatory
framework leaves in place the anti-competitive distribution scheme previously

8
See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989). In Croson, the
Richmond City Council adopted the Minority Business Utilization Plan (the "Plan"). id. at
477. The Plan required contractors to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount
of the contract to a minority-owned sub-contractor. id. The city argued that it intended the
Plan to remedy a history of discrimination that had reduced opportunity for minority
entrepreneurs. id. at 498-99. The Court deemed the Plan unconstitutional because it was a
"rigid racial quota" based only on "an amorphous claim that there has been past
discrimination in a particular industry." id. at 499, 511.
9
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986), cited in Croson, 488
U.S. at 497. In Wygant, the Court invalidated provisions of a collective-bargaining
agreement between the Jackson Board of Education and the local teachers' union. id. at
270-71, 273. The agreement provided that, in the event oflayoffs, the percentage of laid off
employees that were minorities could not exceed the percentage of all employees that were
minorities, regardless of seniority. id. at 270. According to the Court, because the city
could no show specific instances of prior discrimination by the governmental unit, the
provision was invalid. id. at 274.
10
Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86
VA. L. REv. 727, 731-36 (2000) (arguing that the overrepresentation of whites in legal
education and employment can be explained by the antitrust concept of "lock-in" wherein
whites exclude minorities and then use their monopoly power to lock-in standards of
competition that favor whites).
11
See infra Part II.
12
See infra Part III.
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developed---one explicitly based on race.
This Article suggests that we should view equal protection in terms of group
status and competition. This view would shift our current approach to
affirmative action cases away from the individualist discriminatory framework
and toward a framework that principally recognizes that racially and socially
defined groups compete for economic and social benefits and resources. This
competition takes place within an enduring state-sanctioned discriminatory
scheme legitimated by the dominant culture. From this perspective, we may
now see affirmative action cases for what they are, namely manifestations of
intergroup conflict.
But why should we shift to an approach that emphasizes group status and
competition, particularly given the Court's clear rejection of a group rights
approach? One rationale is that the assumptions that might have justified the
focus on individual discrimination are no longer valid. Significant research in
social science describes racial inequality as grounded in notions of group
identity and group conflict. 13 Sociologists and social psychologists who study
discrimination and prejudice have moved away from theories that explain
prejudice solely as a problem of individual perception, and toward theories that
view individual cognitive processes as related to group membership.14 While
present social science yields no consensus view, there is a striking emphasis in
the current literature on group identity theories as "powerful determinants of
behavior." 15 These theories, which stress the importance of prejudice as a
group-based phenomenon 16 and focus on "social-structural theories of group
competition," 17 are particularly resonant for our discussion of affirmative
action and competitive process distortion. Thus, social science scholarship has
recognized that discriminatory behaviors are not just the result of personal,
individual cognitive-process distortions, but are a problem of collective action.
This Article explores this notion of collective action by analyzing the
process by which blacks and whites compete for resources and benefits.18 In
13 David 0. Sears et al., Cultural Diversity and Multicultural Politics: Is Ethnic
Balkanization Psychologically Inevitable, in CULTURAL DIVIDES: UNDERSTANDING AND
OVERCOMING GROUP CONFLICT 35, 40-42 (Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller eds. ,
1999) (providing an overview of group identity and conflict theories); see also RUPERT
BROWN, PREJUDICE: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2-14 (1995) ("[P]rejudice is primarily a

phenomenon originating in group process .... Thus, such intergroup relations as a conflict
over scarce resources, or power domination of one group by another, or gross disparities in
numerical size or status can all .. . have crucial implications for the direction, level, and
intensity of prejudice . . .. ").
14
See, e.g. , Sears et al., supra note 13, at 40-42; BROWN, supra note 13, at 10-12.
15
Sears et al., supra note 13, at 40.
16 BROWN, supra note 13, at l 0-11.
17
Sears et al., supra note 13, at 41. These theories generally maintain that people
naturally form groups and those groups inevitability develop "hierarchies of status and
power." Id. The theories also claim that intergroup rivalry is inevitable. Id.
18
For the purpose of simplicity, I focus solely on the concept of black-white competitive

1094

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1089

certain areas, whites as a group have engaged in conduct that can be seen as
anti-competitive, "locking-in" benefits accrued under a prior, explicitly
segregated era, and creating barriers to entry that prevent blacks as a group
from enjoying those benefits.
Accordingly, the current debate about
affirmative action has been woefully under-inclusive, because it fails to
analyze this underlying competitive framework within which blacks and whites
compete for economic and social benefits and resources. Furthermore, by
failing to recognize the competitive dynamics underlying affirmative action
cases, the courts' decisions have maintained white competitive advantage.
Anti-competitive conduct by the dominant white group undercuts the goals of
equality and anti-discrimination to which our society purportedly subscribes,
and the courts have been complicit in maintaining this structure.
This Article highlights three areas in which this anti-competitive conduct
can be seen: employment, 19 housing 20 and education. 21 Through strict scrutiny
analysis, recent jurisprudence takes an unduly limited approach to interpreting
the demands of equal protection. In these three disparate areas, the courts
engage in a similar strict scrutiny analysis reviewing affirmative action
programs. 22 In each area, the respective court failed to engage in a meaningful
compelling governmental interest analysis, allowing it to ignore the
competitive dynamics underlying each case. These courts then jumped to a
truncated narrow tailoring inquiry, which allowed them to strike down the
affirmative action plans presented. This approach short-circuits meaningful
judicial review of the affirmative action plans crafted by governmental actors.
As a result, the courts leave intact structures that benefit whites at the expense
of blacks. By viewing cases in these areas through the lens of competition, we

dynamics. There is a great deal of complexity inherent in any analysis of affirmative action
and group dynamics, and other racial and ethnic groups compete for resources and benefits
in similar fashions to the concepts that I discuss.
19
MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 13, 15-17 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 920 (2002) (invalidating an FCC regulation that required broadcasters to
enact recruitment procedures designed to increase minority applications because the
regulation was not "narrowly tailored to support a compelling government interest").
20
Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 981-82, 987-88 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1131 (2000) (vacating a lower court's order to construct public housing in
predominantly white neighborhoods because, while motivated by a compelling government
interest, it was not narrowly tailored in light of other possible non-discriminatory remedies). •
21 Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools, 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 10 I 9 (2002) (ordering an injunction requiring school authorities to permit
an elementary student to transfer schools after the authorities rejected the transfer
application because it would upset the "diversity profile").
22
Any race-conscious measure receives strict scrutiny under either the Equal Protection
Clause or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. E.g., Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Under strict scrutiny, all racial
classifications must be "narrowly tailored measures that further compelling government
interests." Id.
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see that different outcomes are both possible and advisable.
The Tenth Circuit's most recent decision in the long-running Adarand
litigation, 23 highlights the approach this Article advocates because the court
began to shift toward viewing discrimination as a form of anticompetitive
conduct. This approach allowed the court to engage in a meaningful
compelling governmental interest inquiry and allowed it to see the ways in
which discrimination locked-in benefits for one group over time. In beginning
to use the language of competition, the court was on the right track toward a
fuller and richer conception of intergroup conflict and anti-competitive
conduct. By following Adarand's lead and analyzing affirmative action
disputes through the lens of competition, courts and policy-makers will
develop a more complete understanding of the dynamics of discrimination and
will develop more thorough tools with which to evaluate cases and create
affirmative action policy.
Part I of this Article discusses the concepts of competition and intergroup
rivalry. It surveys recent scholarship in the social sciences and highlights
social identity theory and realistic group conflict and group position theories.
It focuses on social dominance theory, which analyzes group-based social
hierarchies. This scholarship provides a sound theoretical framework from
which we can understand blacks and whites as groups that compete for benefits
and resources. Part II turns to an examination of the process by which blacks
and whites compete. It discusses legal scholarship that applies antitrust
concepts to discrimination law, and it explores the interrelated nature of the
markets for housing, education, and employment. It then examines the
economic concept of barriers to entry and explores how this concept applies to
black-white intergroup competition.
Part III analyzes three recent cases in the areas of housing, education, and
employment. In each case, a governmental actor attempts to disrupt the system
that has locked-in benefits for whites at the expense of blacks. In each case,
the courts have failed to recognize this attempt for what it is; instead, they
viewed these efforts as simply unconstitutional race-based preferences in favor
of minorities. This section of the Article carefully examines the methods the
courts used to bypass meaningful compelling governmental interest analysis
and jumped to a cursory narrow tailoring analysis. As a result, the courts
thwarted the governmental actors' efforts to create even playing fields in each
of these markets. Finally, Part IV highlights one court that adopts a more
nuanced approach. In the latest installment of the Adarand litigation, the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit made a conscientious effort to analyze the
competitive dynamics undergirding the market for employment in a particular
area. By doing so, the court engaged in a meaningful equal protection analysis
which allowed it to come to the correct conclusion.

23 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 103 (2001) (ruling that revisions to a federal affirmative action program for minority
subcontractors make the program narrowly tailored and constitutional).
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COMPETITION: RACE RELATIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURAL THEORIES OF
INTERGROUP RACIAL CONFLICT

Ideas about competition and fair play are a bedrock of American society and
culture and permeate every area of our work and play. America's love affair
with competition goes beyond an appreciation of its value as the core of our
economic system. Competition and the competitive impulse also stand at the
core of our culture, acting as part of our "national DNA."24 In nearly
everything we do---from our leisure-time activities, such as sports25 and
entertainment,26 to political campaigns27 and business dealings 28--competition
drives how activities are structured, how winners are compensated, and how
losers are consoled. Along with the norm of competition comes at least the
formal commitment to "fair play," to an "even playing field," and to the
promise that the rules of the game will be determined ex ante rather than post
hoc. Thus, it is in the contestants' best interest to structure fair rules
prospectively and to adhere to them (or at least appear to) throughout the
contest because the competitor seeks not just the prize, but the prestige that
accompanies a triumph fairly achieved.29

24

B.W. Powe, Why Tocqueville Still Matters, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 20.
2001 , at 02, Westlaw, ALLNEWS.
25 See After the Tragedy, Sports Will be Therefor America, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001 ,
at 2, LEXIS, News & Business, LAT File (quoting a letter from Alvin M. Okamura):
Sports is our drug. It fills our need for competition, battle-some even call it war. It's
an arena where the rules are set, the competitors are determined, and even the
boundaries or playing field become part of our culture. We love it because it's 'fair.'
26 See Ray Mark Rinaldi & Ellen Futterman, The Trends, The Surprises-and the Disses,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 13, 2002, at El (Everyday Magazine), LEXIS, News &
Business, SLPD File:
Americans love the Academy Awards because they' re all about competition. All that
talk about fashion and box office and who' s escorting whom to the awards is just a
showcase for a big showdown. The Oscars take whatever art may be found in a year of
films and reduce it to a clumsy contest held on one glam night-the perfect
transformation for our dog-eat-dog dispositions.
27 A recent article drew an interesting analogy between the current Oscar race and the
competitive nature of American political campaigns:
You might liken the current phase of the Oscar campaign to political primary
seasons .... All campaigns must operate within a set of guidelines intended to promote
a level playing field . Yet, as in politics, campaigners are always probing for loopholes
and pushing the envelope to see how far they can go before running afoul of the
regulators.
Pat Nason, Hollywood Analysis: What Price, Oscar?, UPI HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb.4. 2002,
LEXIS, News & Business, UPI File.
28 Peter Burrows, Carly's Last Stand?: The Inside Story of the Infighting at HewlettPackard, Bus. WK., Dec. 24, 2001 , at 63, 64 ("[T]hese players will wage one of the biggest
proxy fights in corporate history--one that could tum especially nasty.").
29 The controversy surrounding the pairs figure skating event at the 2002 Winter
Olympic Games in Salt Lake City is illustrative. After allegations that one of the judges of
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The goal of procedural fairness coexists, however, with the desire to triumph
over rivals. In business, a voluminous literature provides information and
guidance to companies eager to develop and maintain competitive
advantages. 3 Companies seeking success in a competitive environment are
advised to reshape the game's context and to change marketplace rules in order
to trump over competitors. 31 Companies attempt to shape the game's context
in several ways. First, they create alliances and merge operations to
"reduce . . . the number of existing rivals. " 32 They also use the "courts,
legislatures, [and] governmental agencies . .. to shape competitive conditions
to [their] advantage." 33 Additionally, they acquire new knowledge, premised
on superior informational and educational access. 34 Changing the game's
context thus allows competitors to outmaneuver other players, preempt rivals,
perform tasks more skillfully, and cooperate with other entities.35 Firms also
exploit the ownership of superior resources, 36 use entry barriers to limit the
number of potential competitors, 37 and exploit market position to undercut
rivals. 38
In a competitive world, winners want to keep on winning, and they
want to keep the prizes or resources accumulated over the course of many
games. As winners accumulate resources, they can use those resources to
change the structure of the game to favor their side. Over time, winners may
compete only with members of favored groups, create barriers to joining the

°

the event was pressured to vote in a certain manner, the International Skating Union
awarded a second set of gold medals to the silver medallists. The core of the controversy
revolved around the perception that the result of the competition was predetermined, that the
"rules of the game" had been violated. Selena Roberts, Canadian Skaters Awarded Share of
Olympic Gold; French Judge Suspended, Her Scoring Thro wn Out, N .Y . TIMES, Feb. 16,
2002, Al (quoting one of the newly-named gold medallists: "We' re happy that justice was
done . . . [t]hat doesn't take anything away from [the other gold medallists]. This was not
something against them; it was something against the system").
30 See, e.g. , RICHARD A. D' AVENI & ROBERT GUNTHER, HYPERCOMPETITION: MANAGING
THE DYNAMICS OF STRATEGIC MANEUVERING (1994); LIAM FAHEY, OUTWITTING,
OUTMANEUVERING, AND OUTPERFORMING COMPETITORS (1999); BENJAMIN GOMESCASSERES, THE ALLIANCE REVOLUTION: THE NEW SHAPE OF BUSINESS RIVALRY (1996);
CURTIS M . GRIMM & KEN G. SMITH, STRATEGY AS ACTION: INDUSTRY RIVALRY AND
COORDINATION (1997); LEE TOM PERRY, OFFENSIVE STRATEGY: FORGING A NEW
COMPETITIVENESS IN THE FIRES OF HEAD-TO-HEAD COMPETITION (1990); KEN G. SMITH,
CURTIS M . GRIMM & MARTIN J. GANNON, DYNAMICS OF COMPETITIVE STRATEGY ( 1992).
3 1 FAHEY, supra note 30, at 13.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 14.
34 Id. at 14-15 .
35 Id. at 19-20.
36 GRIMM & SMITH, supra note 30, at 103-28.
37 D' A VEN! & GUNTHER, supra note 30, 114-51.
38 GRIMM & SMITH, supra note 30, at 131-57.
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game, and collude with others to undercut the ability of other players to
compete against them. Winners can invest resources to restructure the rules of
the game and enhance their chances of winning future contests. At the same
time, winners maintain that the rules of the game are fair, because to believe
otherwise would undermine the prestige associated with winning the prize
fairly.
Similarly, in American culture, blacks and whites have historically acted,
and continue to act, as competitor groups. The focus of this competition is
access to resources, power, and prestige. Historically, whites as a group have
been the winners of this competition, allowing them to build upon and lock-in
the advantages of previous successes. Affirmative action programs can be
seen as a government attempt to assist blacks, as a group, in securing some of
these benefits. However, in analyzing challenges to affirmative action
programs, the courts generally fail to recognize this group rivalry between
blacks and whites.
Historically, we have seen racial discrimination as the fruit of animus, as an
individual's irrational action driven by a cognitive process distortion called
"prejudice."39 The Supreme Court's approach to the Equal Protection Clause
has been consistent with this idea by requiring "invidious discriminatory
purpose"40 or "discriminatory motivation"41 as key to a finding of a violation
of equal protection. At the same time, the Court has focused largely on the
need to protect the rights of individuals in disputes involving equal protection
claims rather than concerning itself with the harms experienced by groups as
groups. 42 This approach has reached its apex in the Court's affirmative action

39 See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 9 (1954) (defining
ethnic prejudice as "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization . . . .");
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 40-42 (20th ann. ed., 1962).
40 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 236-37, 242 (1976) (upholding the
constitutionality of a police department' s entrance exam because there was a lack of
discriminatory intent even though four times as many black applicants failed the test than
did white applicants).
41
See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (holding that plaintiffs
stated a viable cause of action by alleging that the Alabama legislature intentionally redrew
a municipality' s boundaries to exclude all but four or five out of 400 blacks from voting in
an election). The majority in Gomillion principally reviewed the state's action in light of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Whittaker's concurring opinion, however, argued that the
state action violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
42
See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) ("It is the
individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws."). In Gaines, the School of
Law at the State University of Missouri refused to admit the plaintiff, a black applicant. Id.
at 342. The school instead arranged for the student to attend law school in an adjacent state,
but would not provide in-state education. Id. at 343. The court rejected an argument that
limited demand relieved the state's duty to provide separate but equal facilities because "the
petitioner's right is a personal one." Id. at 351.
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doctrine, which protects the rights of individuals in a way that "trumps" the
interests of blacks and other minority group members.43 This focus on
individualism has masked intergroup competition and conflict, and disguised
the complex interactions that undergird disputes. Unfortunately, the Court has
not ordinarily viewed racial discrimination as a function of the process of
rivals interacting to develop and preserve gains.
Recent work in the social sciences provides a solid theoretical framework
for analyzing competition between blacks and whites as intergroup conflict.
Many social science researchers have viewed intergroup relations and
discrimination as behavior that assists in enhancing a particular group's
position. This research suggests that the actions of individual whites can be
seen, in the aggregate, as behaviors intended to protect the interests of the
group to which the individuals belong. Many sociologists and social
psychologists have moved toward normative theories of prejudice and
discrimination that focus on "group categories as powerful determinants of
behavior. " 44 While there is no consensus view among social scientists about
the causes of prejudice and discrimination, 45 several theories have developed
which emphasize social structure and group interests as keys to understanding
how and why discrimination occurs. For instance, social-psychological
theories of intergroup relations and conflict generally place great emphasis on
"the individual's connection to and embeddedness in the larger social
context .... " 46 Social structural theories focus on the "structural relationships
among groups" as vital to understanding the roots of prejudice and
discrimination. 47 Both approaches, however, are grounded in the notion that
groups, and individuals' identification with them, are vital to our
understanding of the causes of prejudice and discrimination.
We begin our discussion of recent social psychological and social structural
approaches to intergroup conflict, by asking two questions. First, why might
an individual identify herself as a member of one group or another? That is,
what does an individual gain from a group-based or category-based identity?
Second, do individuals within groups think that it is important to allocate
resources to those within their group and to deny resources to outgroup
members? If so, why? Recent developments in social psychology offer some
tantalizing responses to these questions.

43

See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U .S. 200, 227 (1995) (stressing that
any governmental attempt to aid a racial group will be "subjected to detailed judicial inquiry
to ensure that the personal right of equal protection of the laws has not been infringed"
(emphasis in original)).
44
Sears et al., supra note 13, at 40.
45
See JIM S!DANWS & FELICIA PRA TIO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF
SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 3-30 (1999) (analyzing various intergroup relations
theories).
46
Id. at 15.
47 Id. at 20.
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Social Identity Theory: The Importance of Group Membership

Social identity theory, first developed by social psychologist Henri Tajfel in
an effort to understand the origins of intergroup conflict, is reflective of the
post-World War II European approach to social psychology. 48 This approach
emphasized people's interactions not as unique individuals but as members of
social groups. 49 Social identity theory has had a tremendous impact on the way
in which social psychologists evaluate intergroup relations, and it has strongly
influenced the recent resurgence of interest and research in group processes in
a variety of areas. 50
Social identity theory posits that an individual's membership in a social
group or groups is a defining aspect of her self-concept. 51 Tajfel defined
"social identity" as an individual's "knowledge that he belongs to certain social
groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of his
membership." 52 Thus, social identity is an individual's understanding of
oneself as a group member.53 Social identity theory is also premised on the
notion that individuals want to view themselves with a positive, rather than a
negative, self-image.54 Thus, according to Taijfel, social identity has two
components: belief that one belongs to a group (e.g., "I am an American") and
the importance of that group membership to one's self (e.g., "and I am damn
proud to be a citizen of the greatest country on earth").55
Tajfel did not argue that an individual's social identity forms the totality of a
person's self-conception; rather, an individual's self-conception is complex
and multifaceted. 56 Instead, social identity theory posits that an individual's
self-conception should be viewed along a continuum. 57 At one end of the
48 Michael A. Hogg & Dominic Abrams, Social Identity and Social Cognition: Historical
Background and Current Trends, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 7, 9 (Dominic
Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1999) [hereinafter Hogg & Abrams, Social Identity and
Social Cognition].
49
Id. at 9-10.
50 Id. at 10-11.
5 1 HENRI T AJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORJES 255 (I 981 ).
52
Id. at 258.
53 Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg, An Introduction to the Social Identity
Approach, in SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY: CONSTRUCTIVE AND CRITICAL ADVANCES 2
(Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1990).
54 TAJFEL, supra note 51, at 45 .
55 Lee Jussim, Richard D. Ashmore & David Wilder, Introduction: Social Identity and
Intergroup Conflict, in SOCIAL IDENTITY, INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND CONFLICT REDUCTION
6 (Richard D. Ashmore et al. eds., 2001).
56 TAJFEL, supra note 51 , at 255 .
57 Id. ("There is no doubt that the image or concept that an individual has of himself or
herself is infinitely more complex, both in its contents and its derivations .. . ."); see also
MICHAEL A. HOGG, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS: FROM ATTRACTION
TO SOCIAL IDENTITY 90 (1992) [hereinafter HOGG, PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS]
("Social behaviour and relations among people vary along a continuum .... ").
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spectrum is the individual's "personal identity," an understanding of one's self
as a "unique and distinct" individual. 58 At the other end of the continuum lies
the individual's "social identity," a conception of the self as '"interchangeable'
with other ingroup members and stereotypically distinct from outgroup
members." 59 This end of the spectrum is important because "self-inclusive
social categories," such as "I am an American," were simultaneously
descriptive, normative and evaluative. 60
The cognitive processes of social categorization and social comparison are
key to social identity theory. Social identity theory posits that social
categorization and social comparison translate into social behaviors. 61 As a
general matter, social categorizations are the cognitive processes by which an
individual breaks down socially important information into discrete units-the
"discontinuous divisions of the social world into distinct classes or
categories."62 More important to social identity theory, however, social
categorizations were the cognitive processes by which individuals assigned
both the self and other people to a "contextually relevant category."63 The
normative and evaluative function of this process was important, such that
outgroup members were homogenized, distanced and stereotyped. 64
Social comparison was the ability to discern among groups differences that
are grounded in social reality (e.g., differences in status, economic attainment
or skin color). 65 Thus, if an important part of an individual's self-conception
revolved around group membership, individuals placed significance on their
group's position vis-a-vis that of other groups. 66 As Tajfel explained, "the
definition of a group (national, racial or any other) makes no sense unless there
are other groups around." 67 From the perspective of social identity theory,
then, an individual's s9cial identity was only really significant when it was
possible to compare the standing of the individual's group in a positive manner

58
59

HOGG, PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS, supra note 57, at 90.
Id.

60
Michael A. Hogg, lntragroup Processes, Group Structure and Social Identity, in
SOCIAL GROUPS AND IDENTITIES: DEVELOPING THE LEGACY OF HENRI TAJFEL 67 (W. Peter
Robinson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Hogg, lntragroup Processes] (noting that self-evaluation
of a social group's standing forms a relative basis for the evaluation of other social groups).
61
HOGG, PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS, supra note 57, at 91 (arguing that
group self-assessments translate into not just attitudinal perceptions but ways of behaving
toward members of other groups).
62
John C. Turner, Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group, in SOCIAL
IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 17 (Henri Tajfel ed. , 1982).
63
Hogg, lntragroup Processes, supra note 60, at 67 (describing the process of
categorization of people, including oneself, into social groups).
64
HOGG, PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS, supra note 57' at 91 .
65 TAJFEL, supra note 51, at 258.
66
Id. at 257-58.
67
Id. at 258.
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relative to that of other groups in a particular milieu. 68
Social identity theory, answering the first question posed above, tells us
what individuals gain by identifying with certain groups.
Ingroup
identification can powerfully enhance an individual's self-evaluation and selfconception.69 Social categories are related to self-concept, and social identity
theory suggests that it is not meaningful to speak of the "individual" as a
socially autonomous creature. It is important, however, to note exactly how
the individual benefits from ingroup identification. Social identity theory
suggests that the individual's enhanced concept of self, gained from ingroup
identification, derives from viewing the ingroup favorably. 70 As Michael
Hogg has explained:
Because social categories contribute to the self-concept and thus serve to
define and evaluate self, we continually try to make intergroup
comparisons on dimensions that already favor the ingroup. We strive for
evaluatively pos1t1ve social identity through positive ingroup
distinctiveness. Social identity theory argues that this reflects a basic
human motivation for positive self-esteem through self-enhancement. 71
Thus, ingroup favoritism can be seen as the sine qua non of a person's
"social identity" because "positive connotations of ingroup membership
become positive connotations of self."72
In the same way, social identity theory begins to offer a possible answer to
our second question, which moves from a descriptive inquiry about individual
self-conception, to a more normative question about how self-conception
affects behavior. Once again, do individuals within groups think that it is
important to allocate resources to those within their group and to discriminate
against outgroup members? Social identity theory suggests that the answer is
"yes."
The classic exposition of the effects of social identity is a series of
experiments conducted by Henri Tajfel (and others) in the early 1970's. In the
"minimal intergroup" experiments, Tajfel attempted to discover the minimum
conditions under which an individual would discriminate in favor of her
ingroup. 73 The experiments demonstrated that social categorization in and of
itself was all that was necessary to trigger intergroup discrimination. 74 This
68
69

Id.

HOGG, PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS, supra note 57, at 92 (explaining how
individuals, motivated by their need for positive self-esteem, fulfill this need through group
distinctiveness).
70
Id. at 91.
71 Id. at 91-92 (emphasis in original).
72
Hogg & Abrams, Social Identity and Social Cognition, supra note 48, at 10.
73 T AJFEL, supra note 51, at 268.
74 Turner, supra note 62, at 22-23.
In his experiment, Professor Tajfel instructed
participants to divide money between two other participants. T AJFEL, supra note 51, at 26869. The participant knew their group membership and the memberships of those between
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means that the "mere perception of belonging to a social category is sufficient
for group behavior."75 The importance of this is the suggestion that an
individual might engage in ingroup discrimination even where the individual
does not stand to gain directly from the discriminatory behavior. As John
Turner has explained in describing the minimal intergroup experiments:
Group membership was anonymous and there was no goal
interdependence, social interaction or other basis for cohesive relations
between members.
Nevertheless, subjects discriminated against
anonymous outgroup and in favour of anonymous ingroup members in
the distribution of monetary rewards-under conditions where they could
non benefit from this strategy. They demonstrated group behaviour in the
form of uniformities in their reactions to others which were consistently
related to their own and the others' group memberships. These results
have been extensively replicated at the level of both behavioural
discrimination and social evaluation. 76
Later studies suggested that similarity of ingroup members is not necessary
for either group formation or intergroup discrimination to occur. 77 In the
context of an important social categorization such as a racial grouping, ingroup
members tend to exaggerate ingroup similarities and outgroup dissimilarities.78
Moreover, ingroup members are attracted to other members simply because
they belong to the same group. 79 Thus, according to the minimal intergroup
experiments, awareness of a common membership was the overriding factor
for individuals to feel and to act as group members. 80
Guided by social identity theory, we would assert that individuals within
groups think that it is important to allocate resources to those within their
group and to discriminate against outgroup members because it contributes to
their own individual self-conception. Thus, where some social category, such
as a racial grouping, plays a role in "defining the self, the need for positive
self-esteem should motivate a desire to evaluate [the ingroup] more
positively. 81
From the social i(\entity perspective, the ingroup may
whom they were dividing the money. Id. Beyond group membership, the participants knew
nothing about the other players. Id. Commenting on the results, Professor Tajfel wrote,
"The results were highly significant in the direction of awarding more money to members of
the 'in-group."' Id.
75 Turner, supra note 62, at 22-23 .
76
Id. at 22.
77
Id. at 22-27.
78 Id. at 28.
79
Id. at 22-27 ("We may not form a group with individuals we like so much as like
people because they belong to our group.").
80
Id. at 27.
81
See id. at 33-34 (stating generally that "favourable comparisons between the ingroup
and an outgroup provide ingroup members with highly subjective status or prestige and thus
positive social identity .. .").
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discriminate against the outgroup not necessarily because there is a realistic
conflict, but "simply to differentiate themselves and maintain a positive social
identity for their members." 82
This observation, however, raises an important and related question about
the nature of the bias. Are outgroup members harmed or discriminated against
because they are outgroup members or instead as a byproduct of the actor's
desire to help ingroup members? Several studies suggest that the need to assist
ingroup members motivates actors more than the desire to harm outgroup
members. 83 This is consistent with the notion, central to social identity theory,
that group identification enhances an individual's self-concept. Thus, "[a]
desire for positive distinctiveness can account for preferential hiring of ingroup
members over outgroup members and for selective investment in projects that
benefit one's own group over others." 84

B.

Related Theories of Intergroup Relations: The Realistic-Group-Conflict
and Group Position Theories

Other social psychological theories also suggest that group members'
perception of group status and position can explain prejudice and intergroup
discrimination. For instance, in 1965, Donald T. Campbell identified a theory
of intergroup relations common to a variety of disciplines within the social
sciences including anthropology, social psychology, and sociology. 85 Dubbing
this approach "realistic-group-conflict theory," Campbell asserted that "group
conflicts are rational in the sense that groups do have incompatible goals and
are in competition for scarce resources." 86 Thus, according to this theory,
prejudice and discriminatory behaviors are inexorably tied to group interests. 87
Competition over limited resources explained problematic attitudes and
behaviors; rivalry for prizes determined the presence and intensity of
intergroup discrimination. 88
82

Id. at 34.
See Marilynn B. Brewer, lngroup Identification and Intergroup Conflict: When Does
lngroup Love Become Outgroup Hate?, in SOCIAL IDENTITY, INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND
CONFLICT REDUCTION 17, 26 (Richard D. Ashmore et al. eds., 2001) ("(T]he experimental
literature on intergroup discrimination provides evidence that the primary motivation is to
benefit the ingroup rather than harm the outgroup.").
84 Id. at 27 (relating the study of intergroup relationships to real world examples of selfjustified harm to others).
85
Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentric and Other Altruistic Motives, in NEBRASKA
SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 283, 283-87 (David Levine ed., 1965); see a/so BROWN, supra
note 13, at 163.
86 Campbell, supra note 85, at 287 (noting that this rational basis for group conflict is a
central assumption of the realistic-group-conflict theory).
87
BROWN,supra note 13, at 163.
88 David 0. Sears, Race in American Politics: Framing the Debates, in RACIALIZED
POLITICS: THE DEBATE ABOUT RACISM IN AMERICA l, 22 (David 0. Sears et al. eds., 2000).
Sidanius and Pratto have summarized the realistic-group-conflict approach in the following
83
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Closely related to the realistic-group-conflict theory, the group position
theory also emphasizes power imbalances between groups as a basis for
prejudice and intergroup discrimination. 89 The origins of the group position
theory can be traced back to the work of Herbert Blumer. 90 Blumer postulated
that racial prejudice is a function of one group's position vis a vis the position
of another group, rather than a function of antipathetic feelings directed at
specific individuals. 91
For Blumer, this shifted the focus from a
"preoccupation with feelings as lodged in individuals to a concern with the
relationship of racial groups." 92 Racial groups form images of themselves and
others, he claims, through a collective process. 93 Hostility may emerge as a
defensive reaction when one's sense of group position is challenged. 94 Blumer
maintains that this challenge may come in many forms such as economic
competition or encroachment into areas previously thought to belong solely to
one's own group. 95
More recently, some scholars have used the realistic-group-conflict and
group position theories to explain contradictions in white Americans' racial
attitudes. For instance, Lawrence Bobo applied realistic-group-conflict theory
manner:
[T]he perception that one group's gain is another's los translates into perceptions of
group threat, which in turn cause prejudice against the outgroup, negative stereotyping
of the outgroup, ingroup solidarity, awareness of ingroup identity, and internal
cohesion, including intolerance .of ingroup deviants, ethnocentrism, use of group
boundary markers, and discriminatory behavior.
SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 45, at 17 (citing Campbell, supra note 85).
89 Sears, supra note 88, at 20-21 . The sense of group position theory has been referred to
as a "social structural" theory of intergroup relations-that is, as a theory that emphasizes
the "structural relationships among groups" over the individual-level cognitive process of
individuals. Id. at 20. From this perspective, the group position theory can be viewed as the
"sociological version of realistic group conflict theory." Id.
90
See Herbert Blumer, Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position, in NEW
TRIBALISMS: THE RESURGENCE OF RACE & ETHNICITY 31, 31-40 (Michael w. Hughey ed.,
1998).
91
Id. at 31-32.
92 Id. at 31 (arguing that such a shift would "yield a more realistic and penetrating
understanding of race prejudice").
93 Id. In summarizing Blumer's thesis, editor Michael W. Hughey writes:
Blumer points out that race (and ethnic) prejudice emerges out of the ongoing relations
between groups, and especially from shifts in a group's sense of its social position
relative to that of other groups. In particular, the real or imagined social ascent of the
subordinate group is perceived by dominant group members as an indication of their
own decline, or as a diminution of their group's honor, resulting in an intensification of
prejudicial attitudes toward the offending group, often combined with actions designed
to restore it to its rightful "place."
Michael W. Hughey, Introduction, in NEW TRIBALISMS: THE RESURGENCE OF RACE &
ETHNICITY 1, 2 (Michael W. Hughey ed., 1998).
94 Id. at 35-36.
95

Id.
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to whites' attitudes toward busing. 96 Bobo argued that white opposition to
busing was a reflection of structural relationships between blacks and whites,
as opposed to "a new manifestation of prejudice."97 Bobo emphasized
members' sense of belonging and status rather than any direct threat posed to a
particular individual's welfare as keys to understanding the negative
predisposition of whites toward busing. From this perspective, Bobo wrote:
As group membership and status play a role in the calculation of
individual interests, it seems inappropriate to view self-interest or group
conflict as based solely on objective, immediate threats to an individual's
private well-being; challenges to group status or position are equally
important. 98
Bobo's approach correlated white opposition to busing to a diminution to
the group's long-term interests. 99 Thus, Bobo shifted from a conception of
prejudice as a product of "preadult socialization," 100 toward an examination of
how a particular public policy initiative threatened to redistribute group
resources, thereby posing significant threats to the economic and social status
of the group. 101
Similarly, Bobo, together with James R. Kluegel and Ryan A. Smith, argued
that group position theory can explain the apparent contradiction between
whites' increasing comfort with blacks, but more negative attitude toward
social policies intending to improve blacks' status. 102 Applying the group
position theory to the changed circumstances and differing needs of modem
racism illustrates the theory's dynamism and adaptability. 103 Thus, whites
generally discard old style "Jim Crow" racism and embrace "laissez-faire"
racism (stereotyping, blaming, and resistance to policies aimed at assisting
blacks) so that the "dominant racial group [can] maintain a privileged status
relative to members of a subordinate racial group." 104 According to these
approaches, whites' policy preferences are rooted in a belief that their race
ought to be dominant, rather than on irrational animus toward blacks. 105
96 Lawrence Bobo, Whites' Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group
Conflict?, 45 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1196, 1197 (1983).
97
Id. at 1196.
98 Id. at 1200.
99
Id. at 1201.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102
Lawrence Bobo, James R. Kluegel & Ryan A. Smith, Laissez-Faire Racism: The
Crystallization of a Kinder, Gentler, Antiblack Ideology, in RACIAL ATTITUDES IN THE
1990's 15, 22 (Steven A. Tuch & Jack K. Martin eds., 1997) (relating modem racist
attitudes to Blumer's group position theory by characterizing these attitudes as a defensive
reaction to a perceived threat from blacks).
103 Id.
104
105

Id. at 22.
Id. at 38 (asserting that attitudes on race are "statements about preferred social
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Striving for Synthesis: Social Dominance Theory

Social dominance theory, a relatively new concept, also views prejudice and
discrimination through the lens of group conflict and social hierarchy.
Although both the realistic-group-conflict and the group position theories focus
almost exclusively on contests for power or status among dominant and
subordinate groups, social dominance theory focuses on the individual's
cognitive function within the context of group rivalries. 106 Associated with the
work of Professors Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, social dominance theory is
an attempt to synthesize a variety of theories concerning prejudice and
discrimination including social identity, realistic-group-conflict and group
position. 107 Social dominance theory posits a more thoroughly integrated
theory of prejudice, intergroup relations, and discrimination to explain social
inequality. 108
Social dominance theory begins with the notion that "all human societies
tend to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies." 109
Membership in certain socially constructed groups, such as racial or ethnic
groups or groups organized along economic lines, provides group members
with access to prestige, social power and privilege. 110 According to Sidanius
and Pratto, group-based social hierarchy refers to the amount of prestige, social
power and privilege provided to individual group members that cannot be
understood to flow from any individual's particular merit, talent, achievement
or ability. 111 Therefore, a group-based social hierarchy is a vehicle for
ensuring the provision of prestige, social power and privilege, irrespective of
individual merit.
How are group-based social hierarchies maintained? Three intertwined
processes support and maintain group-based social hierarchies: aggregated
institutional discrimination, aggregated individual discrimination and

positional relations among racial groups ... not simply or even mainly emotional reactions
to groups, group symbols, or situations"); Sears, supra note 88, at 24-25 ; see also Lawrence
Bobo & Vincent L. Hutchings, Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending
Blumer 's Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Context, 61 AMER. Soc. REv. 951
( 1996) (examining the effect of perceived threats on race relations).
106 See Sears, supra note 88, at 25-27.
107
SJDANIUS & PRA ITO, supra note 45, at 3-31 (surveying major theories of intragroup
and intergroup relations).
108 Id. at 3-4; Jim Sidanus & Felicia Pratto, The Inevitability of Oppression and the
Dynamics of Social Dominance, in PREJUDICE, POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN DILEMMA 173,
173-74 (Paul M. Sniderman et al. eds., 1993).
109
SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 45 , at 31 (emphasis omitted).
11 0 Id. at 32 (contrasting group-based social hierarchy to individual-based social
hierarchy where individual characteristics, like athletic ability, lead to social power,
prestige, and privilege, rather than one's ascribed membership in a particular group).
111 Id.
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behavioral asymmetry. 112 Aggregated individual discrimination includes the
"simple, daily and sometimes quite inconspicuous individual acts of
discrimination by one individual against another," which in the aggregate
eventually construct unequal power relations between social groups. 113
Similarly, aggregated institutional discrimination refers to the discriminatory
practices--either intended or unconscious---of important social institutions
such as the courts and schools, which "result in the disproportionate allocation
of positive and negative social value across the social status hierarchy." 114
Behavioral asymmetry is the observation that both dominant and subordinate
groups collude and cooperate to sustain present arrangements. 115 Thus,
"within relatively stable group-based hierarchies, most of the activities of
subordinates can be characterized as cooperative of, rather than subversive to,
the system of group-based domination." 116
Social dominance theory's key insight is its emphasis on the individual-level
forces that contribute to the perpetuation of group-based social hierarchies.
Sidanius and Pratto propounded the concept of "social dominance orientation"
("SDO") or the "value that people place on nonegalitarian and hierarchically
structured relationships among social groups." 117 SDO is an individual-level
process that measures a particular individual's support for intergroup
inequality and subordination. 118 As was the case in social identity theory, SDO
hinges on the importance of self-esteem to the individual's self-concept. Thus,
Sidanius and Pratto argue that dominant group members can be expected to
exhibit high levels of SDO because "people's general desire for positive selfesteem is compatible with hierarchy-legitimizing myths ... making group
superiority seem appropriate to them." 119
Focusing on individuals with a high-level of SDO is important because it
indicates who is likely to discriminate against particular groups. 120 But this
view is not wholly psychological, and it does not suggest that individuals with
a propensity for a high-level SDO are somehow aberrant or abnormal. 121

112

Id. at 39.
Id. at 39-41.
114
Id. at 41.
115
Id. at 43-44 (differentiating behavioral asymmetry from earlier structural models that
failed to recognize "the manner in which subordinates actively participate in and contribute
to their own subordination").
116 Id.
111 Id.at 61.
118
SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 45, at 77.
119 Id. Other factors suggesting high levels of SDO include an individual's background
and socialization, personality, and gender. See id. at 49; see also Sears, supra note 88, at 26
("[A]n important individual-level force[] is social dominance orientation, the desire to
establish and maintain such social inequalities.").
120 SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 45, at 95.
121 Id. at 302.
113
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Social dominance theory differs from the purely psychological view espoused
by Gordon Allport, for instance, which saw racial prejudice as fundamentally
irrational in nature. 122
Instead, social dominance theory, while predicated on individuals'
psychological bias, understands psychological bias or SDO from the
perspective of the human desire to produce group-based social hierarchies. At
the same time, such psychological biases and group-based social hierarchies
are seen as mutually self-enforcing. Intergroup discrimination results because
"individual psychological biases and social context not only [lead] individuals
to discriminate, but also [facilitate] institutional discrimination." 123
Consequently, social dominance theory provides an integrated theory that
describes how individual-level psychological processes are related to groupbased hierarchies (i.e., inequality among social groups). 124 As we will see, an
understanding of these social psychological approaches to intergroup relations
informs our analysis of affirmative action law.
II.

THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS: INTERGROUP RIVALRY IN ACTION

Social science research provided us with a basis for looking at whites and
blacks as rival groups competing for resources. However, we need to go
further to analyze the process by which those groups compete. This Article
posits that blacks and whites, competing as groups, seek to attain competitive
advantage in areas such as housing, education, and employment. Furthermore,
economically and socially dominant groups may engage in anti-competitive
conduct to "lock-in" the benefits they have historically enjoyed. Over time,

122

See ALLPORT, supra note 39, at 27:
This propensity lies in his normal and natural tendency to form generalizations,
concepts, categories, whose content represents an oversimplification of his world of
experience. His rational categories keep close to first-hand experience, but he is able to
form irrational categories just as readily. In these even a kernel of truth may be
lacking, for they can be composed wholly of hearsay evidence, emotional protections,
and fantasy .
See also THOMAS F. PETTIGREW ET AL. , PREJUDICE 2 (1980) ("Prejudice, then, can be
thought of as irrationally based, negative attitudes against certain ethnic groups and
their members." (emphasis in original)).
123
SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 45, at 304.
124 Sidanius and Pratto have described the interlocking nature of social dominance theory
in the following manner:
Once such hierarchically organized systems emerge, the experiences of living in group
dominance societies . . . and having experiences associated with membership in
dominant or subordinate groups ... affect people's levels of [SDO] .... The cultural
ideologies that are part of group dominance societies are so thoroughly learned and so
widely recognized that it is easy for one person to evoke the ideology in another person
and so influence that person's behavior to enact that ideology. The discrimination that
can result helps to re-create the social conditions that are likely to trigger the ideology
in the future.
Id.
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this has resulted in a social structure that perpetuates benefits unfairly gained.
By attempting to disrupt those structures, affirmative action programs intend to
restore a level playing field to the extent possible.
Several legal scholars have made connections between the anticompetitive
conduct that is largely condemned in the law of antitrust and social group
conduct that stifles competition and maintains certain social and economic
benefits. 125 For example, Robert Cooter has argued that social groups "collude
to obtain the advantages of monopoly control over markets." 126 This critique
analogized the behavior of discriminating social groups to that of cartels. 127 A
cartel is an "agreement among otherwise competing firms to reduce their
output to agreed upon levels, or sell at an agreed upon price." 128 A classic
example of a cartel is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
("OPEC"), which is comprised of a small group of oil producing countries that
have agreed to limit the amount of petroleum exported, thus maintaining high
demand and ensuring excess profits. 129 Thus, cartelization is attractive because
it facilitates the ability of member-firms to earn monopoly profits. 130 The
cartel model thus demonstrates that discriminatory social groups have an
incentive to exclude members of other social groups. 131
The cartel approach reinforces the argument that individuals must be viewed
as members of groups who desire to further the interests of their
communities. 132 Like classic business cartels, social group cartels were
inherently unstable, requiring that ingroup members be sanctioned for
transgressing group norms and the presence of some formal system of approval
to prevent collapse. 133 The cartel analogy is an extremely useful foundation for
directing our thinking about how socially and racially defined groups can

125
See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133
(1994); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995); Roithmayr, supra
note 10, at 734.
126
Cooter, supra note 125, at 150.
127 Id. at 153-54.
128
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 144 (2d ed. 1999).
129 RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 287 (1984).
130
HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 144.
131
Cooter, supra note 125, at 153 ("[A] group with the power to reduce competition
from others can benefit itself, whether the group is defined by race, religion, gender, or
industry.").
132
See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 722 ("Groups exist in a sense that goes beyond
individuals having similar traits. People act together, in the strong sense of working out
common goals and then engaging in a cooperative process of trying to achieve them."); see
also McAdams, supra note 125, at 1007-08 (explaining that discrimination requires sacrifice
from its members that is often motivated by a member's desire for status within the group).
133
Cooter, supra note 125, at 153-54.
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operate to impede competition. 134
Similarly, Daria Roithmayr showed how an early monopoly of sorts has
produced a law school admissions scheme that "favors white cultural
performances and disproportionately excludes people of color." 135 Her
powerful article elucidates how law school admissions standards-largely
developed in a segregated and non-competitive era-locked-in gains for white
students. 136 Furthermore, law school admissions standards and their influence
on the school's prestige operate as a "positive feedback loop," reinforcing and
strengthening the dominant group's advantage. 137 Roithmayr provides a
rigorous analysis of this anti-competitive process, and correctly views
affirmative action as a kind of antitrust remedy. 138
The works of scholars such as Cooter and Roithmayr lay a solid foundation
for importing economic concepts to discrimination law, and are important
additions to our discussion of intergroup competition. 139 As these scholars
demonstrate, the law of antitrust (and economic concepts more generally)
provides a rich vocabulary with which to describe anti-competitive actions and
to analyze the effects of these behaviors. In an effort to create the state of
"perfect competition," antitrust seeks to prevent firms in a marketplace from
distorting the competitive process. 140 To prevent distortion, antitrust law has
134
See also McAdams, supra note 125, at 1007 ("[S]olidarity and loyalty within groups
lead[s] predictably, if not inevitably, to competition and conflict between groups.").
135
Roithmayr, supra note 10, at 734. Roithmayr argued that "white cartels excluded
nonwhites from legal education" as follows:
First, law schools adopted admissions standards using criteria that excluded people of
color. Second, legal professionals campaigned to move legal education from
apprenticeships to the university . . . . Third, leaders of the profession drove out night,
part-time, and private programs that catered to people of color and immigrants.
Id. at 758. Roithmayr argues also that law school rankings and standardized admissions
tests perpetuate this lock-in effect. Id. at 764-66. Roithmayr maintains that the performance
of minorities does not conform to the standards included in the tests. Id. at 734, National
rankings, however, award those schools that accept only those students who perform well on
the standardized tests. Id. at 765.
136
Id. at 729.
137
Id. at 732.
138
Id. at 793-96.
139
Professor Ian Ayres and Frederic E. Vars have also imported economic theories into
an analysis of affirmative action. See Ian Ayres & Frederic E. Vars, When Does Private
Discrimination Justify Public Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1614 (1998).
Ayres and Vars contend that private discrimination against minorities in business can take
two forms: upstream or downstream discrimination. Id. Upstream discrimination occurs
when suppliers charge higher prices or refuse to deal with minority firms. Id. Conversely,
downstream discrimination exists when buyers offer lower prices or refuse to deal with
minority firms. Id.
Ayres and Vars state that "[e]ither upstream or downstream
discrimination can reduce the private sales of minority firms and upstream discrimination
can reduce the sales of minority firms to the government." Id.
140
JOSEPH E. STJGLITZ, ECONOMICS A 16 (2d ed. 1997) (defining "perfect competition" as
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recognized that a variety of techniques can be used to further an oppressive use
of market power. Antitrust law is primarily concerned with promoting
allocative efficiency (consumer welfare) and dynamic efficiency (innovation
and technological change) rather than with ensuring that the interests of all
market participants are adequately protected at any given time. 141 Antitrust
law and policy have also recognized that the actions of a particular competitor
or group of competitors can distort the competitive process, thereby
undercutting important antitrust goals. 142 A central aim of antitrust law is to
"prevent economic oppression by maintaining competition." 143 This aim is
important enough to occasionally restrict a firm's liberty to engage in
particular behavior. 144
The goal of antitrust law is to "maintain public confidence in the market
mechanism by deterring and punishing instances of economic oppression." 145
Thus, competition among players in those markets must be maintained in order
to achieve this aim. 146 The goal is to allow market forces to operate freely so
as to "allocate resources among Americans," 147 but this can only be achieved
in a regime that values and affirms free competition.
The emphasis on fair competition is equally important to our analysis of
black/white intergroup relations. I do not argue that antitrust law should be
applied to affirmative action cases, nor do I argue that antitrust law is a perfect
analogy for discrimination cases. What I do argue is that antitrust is explicitly
concerned with establishing the "rules of the game" in competitive markets,
and its jurisprudence focuses on analyzing the dynamics of those markets.

occurring in instances where "each firm is a price taker-it cannot influence the market
price; at the market price, the firm can sell as much as it wishes, but if it raises its price, it
loses all sales").
141
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 12-13 (2000); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 344 (1962) ("It is competition, not competitors, which the [Clayton] Act protects."). In
Brown Shoe, the Court enjoined a merger between the third and eighth largest sellers of
shoes in the United States. Id. at 297, 346. The Court concluded that the merger violated §
7 of the Clayton Act because it would "lessen competition substantially." Id. at 346.
142
See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 141 , at 14. This is consistent with at least one
explanation of the origins of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, that is, that it was passed to
protect small firms against anti-competitive behavior on the part of " large vertically
integrated firms." HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 50. See generally Thomas J. DiLorenzo,
The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest Group Perspective, 5 INTER. REV. L. & ECON. 73
(1985).
143
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 141 , at I 0.
144
See id. at 644-45 (describing remedies in vertical merger enforcement including
prohibiting mergers and requiring a divestiture); HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 638
(describing the potential for equitable relief in numerous antitrust contexts).
145
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 141 , at 9-10.
146
Id. at I 0.
141

Id.
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This Article is primarily concerned with the ways in which anticompetitive
conduct can create and perpetuate unfair advantage in the ongoing competitive
market. The concept of anticompetitive conduct in economics, as shown by
the scholars mentioned earlier, provides important insights into a discussion of
affirmative action. Building upon those insights, we can go even further in
exploring the ways in which blacks and whites engage as groups in a
competitive process. In particular, blacks and whites compete on a variety of
different levels and in an interrelated manner.
The Red Group and the Blue Group

A.

Let us begin our discussion of the process by which groups compete by
examining a hypothetical game. Suppose that a dominant group (the "red
group") and a non-dominant group (the "blue group") are competing for the
same outcome. Success, in this game, is measured by the ability of players to
secure large financial assets, obtain particular employment opportunities,
maintain positions of influence in corporate, media and governmental sectors,
wield political power, and safeguard their homes and environs.
How would red group members succeed? At a minimum, red group
members would need to secure access to superior opportunities in at least three
key areas: neighborhoods, schools, and jobs. Thus, housing, education, and
employment form an interlocking web of sources of social and economic
power. 148 For red group members to succeed over time, they need access to
this trinity of "inputs." Because these three are so inextricably linked, it is
difficult to discuss each individually. It is useful to explore the linkages
among them, and to identify the ways in which they mutually reinforce one
another as sources of competitive advantage.
Initially, the ability to succeed in our game would require access to
neighborhoods with low crime rates, good schools, and good jobs. Access to
such neighborhoods, in turn, would lead to a myriad advantages paying everincreasing dividends over time. 149 Neighborhoods with low crime rates allow
players to concentrate on developing intellectual, cultural, and pecuniary
capital, instead of dispersing energies on securing personal safety and
protecting personal property. Such neighborhoods provide access to superior
educational training, as school enrollment is usually dictated by neighborhood

148

See john a. powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80 MINN:

L. REv. 749, 758 (1996) (describing the impact of residential segregation which

concentrates race and poverty and which leads to isolation from the "opportunity structure,
including education, health care, and jobs, all of which are necessary to succeed in our
society").
149 See generally Xavier de Souza Briggs, Social Capital and Segregation: Race,
Connections, and Inequality in America, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Working Paper Series RWP02-0l l (February 2002) (examining the "power of
place to shape lives and life chances").
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residence. 150 Thus, the "raw material" of education is supplied through access
to good neighborhoods. 151 Moreover, neighborhood school funding is often
tied to the value of the homes in the particular school district, and many
players are attracted to neighborhoods because of the presence of good
schools. 152
Thus, there is a dynamic relationship between school and neighborhood
quality. Consequently, red group members may lock-in educational benefits in
one of two ways. They may block blue group members from their
neighborhoods by employing a "stand and fight" approach, which slows any
attempt at entry by blue group members. In the alternative, they may relocate
to other neighborhoods already populated by other red group members, leaving
blue group members behind. By employing either of these techniques, red
group members protect property values and ensure wealth accumulation. 153
The relationship between good schools and good neighborhoods is symbiotic,
with each enhancing and simultaneously reinforcing the value of the other.
Education itself is another key component of the interrelated web of social
and economic well-being. There is a strong correlation between education and
150 See Molly S. McUsic, The Law 's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promise
and Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES

FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88, 97-99 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999). McUsic
discusses the disadvantages faced by public schools in low-income residential areas. Id.
Since most public schools receive a great deal of funding from a local property tax, schools
in poorer areas are unable to collect as much as schools in wealthy areas. Id. Additionally,
public schools in low-income areas tend to have more students. Id. Zoning and
development restrictions in wealthy areas tends to discourage large amounts of residential
development and, as a result, keep the number of school-aged children down. Id.
151
See john a. powell, Segregation and Educational Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public
Schools, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & PoL'Y 337, 339 (1995) ("Public schools in the cities
quickly became majority-minority and poor; and have been characterized by inferior
facilities, overcrowded classes, high dropout rates, weak educational outcomes, and
diminished life opportunities for students."); see also DOUGLAS s. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 14142 (1993).
152
Ingrid Gould Ellen, Race-based Neighbourhood Projection: A Proposed Framework
for Understanding New Data on Racial Integration, 37 URB. STUD. 1513, 1513-14 (2000)
(arguing that neighborhood entry decisions are based upon expectations about neighborhood
conditions, including school quality, and that "race is still relevant .. . because rightly or
wrongly, white households (and some black households as well) tend to associate an
increasing minority presence in a neighborhood with structural decline").
153 MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 147-51 (1995) (indicating that housing in white
neighborhoods is valued higher and appreciates at a more enhanced rate than housing in
black neighborhoods); Nancy Denton, The Role of Residential Segregation in Promoting
and Maintaining Inequality in Wealth and Property, 34 lND. L. REV. 1199, 1205 (2001)
("Residential segregation limits individual accumulation of human capital via education and
the job market.").

2002]

INTERGROUP RIVALRY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

1115

enhanced economic and social outcomes. 154 Superior educational trammg
allows players to gain entrance to selective colleges and universities, and to
obtain employment requiring high levels of skill, which in tum generates
higher incomes. 155 The importance of education cannot be overstated,
particularly in a twenty-first century economy where the best opportunities
belong to knowledge workers. 156 In such an economy, a strong educational
background is required for workers seeking to remain competitive for highlycompensated positions. 157 Indeed, "most of the fastest growing jobs will
require a college degree." 158 Skills, which are a direct by-product of education,
are the centerpiece of the new knowledge-based economy. 159 Access to
superior educational opportunities both increases the ability to access
informational and social networks through which sought-after employment
opportunities are often advertised, and assures that particular candidates will be
well-qualified for superior employment positions. 160
154

Gary Orfield, Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation,
The Civil Rights Project (July, 2001), at http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/
resegregation0 1/schoolsseparate.pdf. ( accessed October 11, 2002) ("[T]he consequences of
unequal education have become more severe because employment and income are [more]
sharply linked to education than in the past."); CHRJSTOPHER JENCKS, WHO GETS AHEAD? :
THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC SUCCESS IN AMERJCA 187-90 (1977).
155
See Paul William Kingston & John C. Smart, The Economic Pay-Off of Prestigious
Colleges, in THE HIGH STATUS TRACK: STUDIES OF ELITE SCHOOLS AND STRATIFICATION 147,
147-74 (Paul William Kingston & Lionel S. Lewis eds., 1990) ("Let us be clear about our
key finding: graduation from a relatively small set of institutions at the top of the academic
hierarchy has been distinctly rewarded . .. ."); see also Irene Browne, Cynthia Hewitt,
Leann Tigges & Gary Green, Why Does Job Segregation Lead to Wage Inequality Among
African Americans? Person, Place, Sector, or Skills?, 30 Soc. Sci. RES. 473, 492 (2001)
(articulating the "skills mismatch thesis," and finding that "skills at both the individual and
the job level .. . underlie the relation between job segregation by race and wages among
African Americans").
156
See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Futurework: Trends and Challenges for Work in the 21st
Century, 44 OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK Q. 31, 36 (Summer, 2000), at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ooq/2000/surnmer/art04.htm (accessed October 11, 2002)
("[O]btaining education, skills training, and occupational information for career
planning .. . is the key to succeeding in the workforce of the future.") .
157
Id. at 35.
158 id.
159

LESTER C. THuRow, BUILDING WEALTH: THE NEW RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS,
COMPANIES, AND NATIONS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 130-31 (1999) (asserting that,
in the future, knowledge will replace natural resources "as the key ingredient in the third
industrial revolution").
160
Jomills Henry Braddock II & James M. McPartland, How Minorities Continue to be
Excluded From Equal Employment Opportunity: Research on Labor Market and
Institutional Barriers, 43 J. Soc. ISSUES 5, 7 (1987) (reporting that, according to a national
survey or employers, informal recruiting through social contacts is among the most widelyused method of recruiting employees at all job levels); see Luis M. Falcon & Edwin
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Access to superior neighborhoods continues to shape future outcomes
because of the interrelationship among good neighborhoods, good schools, and
desirable employment. Access to superior neighborhoods grants access to
good schools, and also grants access to superior employment opportunities that
might not be available to those living in more distant areas. 161 Access to
superior neighborhoods also allows for heightened capital accumulation
because the residential property value in such neighborhoods appreciates. 162
Access to superior employment opportunities allows red group members to
accumulate financial resources, engage in intergenerational wealth transfers
that benefit other red group members, influence the political process, and
otherwise direct the cultural, financial, governmental, and media entities and
organizations that shape and control society.
The social psychological and social structural theories described earlier add
an important layer to this discussion. Red group members may not perceive
their actions to preserve and protect their advantages as discriminatory. To be
sure, some red group members may engage in "protective" activities explicitly
for race-based reasons. But other red group members may not be motivated by
animus or the desire to harm or discriminate against blue group members.
Rather, they may simply intend to maintain superior access to social and
economic opportunities. Whether motivated by animus or not, those actions
clearly have the effect of locking-out blue group members from the
competitive process over both the short and long-term. This issue of
motivation is key to the way we analyze the results.

Melendez, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Job Searching in Urban Centers, in URBAN
INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR CITIES 341, 346-66 (Alice O'Connor et al. eds., 2001)
(describing differences in the use of personal networks for job searches across racial and
ethnic lines).
161
Here, I allude to the "spatial mismatch hypothesis," which is essentially the notion
that "involuntary residential segregation of blacks to the inner city, coupled with the
movement of jobs from central cities to suburbs, has disadvantaged blacks both absolutely
and relative to whites in metropolitan labor markets." Michael A. Stoll & Steven Raphael,

Racial Differences in Spatial Job Search Patterns: Exploring the Causes and Consequences,
76 ECON. GEO. 201, 201 (2000). Recent social science research has supported this
hypothesis, finding that high levels of residential segregation ensure both that whites and
minority group members will search for work in different parts of a metropolitan area and
that minority group members will search for jobs where employment growth is low. Id. at
202-03; see also SUSAN TuRNER MEIKLEJOHN, WAGES, RACE, SKILLS AND SPACE: LESSONS
FROM EMPLOYERS IN DETROIT'S AUTO INDUSTRY 51-92 (2000) (arguing that place of
residence strongly influences work search and employment outcomes); Joleen Kirschenman
& Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them, But ... ": The Meaning of Race for
Employers, in RACE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: CONTENDING VIEWS ON PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND ETHNOVIOLENCE 115, 115-23 (Fred L. Pincus & Howard J. Ehrlich
eds., 1994) (asserting that race and inner-city residence are highly correlated and that
employers often view inner-city residents as undesirable workers).
162
OLIVER & SHAPIRO,supra note 153, at 147-51; Denton, supra note 153, at 1206-08.
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The Impact of "Barriers to Entry"

B.

Let us now transition from our hypothetical red and blue groups and move
toward an examination of intergroup relations in the real world. When
considering the real world, we need to be aware of the structural mechanisms
group members use to preserve and protect advantages. If we consider the
areas of housing, education, and employment as analogous to markets, what
mechanisms would prevent one group from accessing those markets? The
economic concept of "barriers to entry" provides interesting insights for
intergroup competition.
"Conditions of entry," from an economic perspective, are the structural
conditions under which competitors enter a given market. 163 They are the
passageways through which competition between new entrants and incumbents
occurs. 164 According to economic theory, without entry barriers, a seller's
potential profits are typically low because other players freely enter the market,
offer competitive prices, and thus drive prices and profits down for all
players. 165 From this perspective, a barrier to entry is "some factor in a market
that permits firms already in the market to earn monopoly profits, while
deterring outsiders from coming in." 166 Thus, a barrier to entry disrupts what
would be expected to occur if conditions to entry were "free," and allows firms
to "elevate price above a long-run competitive level." 167 Barriers to entry can
take a variety of forms including high entry costs, imperfect access to
information, and government regulation. 168 This Article will argue that
intergroup discrimination also belongs among the list of barriers to entry.
The risk and size of the investment needed to enter a particular market is
one kind of barrier to entry. Prospective market entrants assess the level of
financial risk required to enter that market. This assessment differs from one
that solely looks at the expense of entering in a new market-which, in itself,
may or may not act as a barrier to entry. Rather, markets that require large
entry costs that cannot be recouped pose significant risk and, therefore, can act
as barriers to entry for new market participants. For example, if a prospective
market entrant must spend a high fixed amount on a generic warehouse and

163

JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 3 (1956).
164
Id. ("Let us understand the term 'condition of entry' to an industry to mean something
equivalent to the 'state of potential competition' from possible new sellers.").
165
Id. (explaining, alternatively, that barriers to entry permit firms to elevate prices over
time and that entry will hinder prices only when prices exceed a "super-competitive level").
166 HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 39.
167
BAIN, supra note 163, at 17. Throughout this discussion, I use the more liberal
"Bainian" definition of entry barriers which "treats as a barrier any factor that as a realistic
matter discouraged entry," as opposed to the more narrow definition favored by G.J. Stigler.
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 141, at 65 (limiting barriers to entry to just those costs
forced upon new entrants that were not forced upon incumbent firms).
168
STIGLITZ, supra note 140, at 349-53.
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delivery trucks to enter a particular market, the financial risk is not that
significant. 169 If the business fails, the player can probably liquidate these
common and salable assets readily and make back most of her investment. 170
However, if the prospective market entrant must build a highly specialized
processing plant that can be used only for one purpose, the financial risk is
significant. 171 If the business fails, the cost of building this plant is a "sunk
cost," which the player will not be able to recover. 172 Thus, the prospect of
losing a sunk cost makes this market less attractive for new entrants.
There are interesting analogies that can be explored when viewing
discrimination as a barrier to entry into the markets for education, housing and
employment. Assume that a law school education at an exclusive private
school currently costs approximately $90,000. 173 Consider, then, a black
student assessing her prospects in the legal job market. If our student believes
that she can get a job and perhaps become a partner at a high-paying firm,
there is no significant barrier to entry because she will earn enough money to
recoup her initial investment. However, employment discrimination, whether
real or perceived, may act as a barrier to entry. Our student might look at the
legal market and understand that there is a possibility that her investment in
education will be a sunk cost. Because of discrimination, there is less of a
chance that our student will get a well-paying, big-firm job, and discrimination
may reduce her chances of advancing within firms and being as financially
successful as her white male counterparts. 174
Thus, employment
discrimination, or the perception of employment discrimination, may act as a
barrier to entry in some fields in which the cost of entering the market, and the
risk inherent in that cost, are high. 175

169 HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 528 (explaining that if, in order to enter a market, a
firm must invest in things that are generally useful, the costs of which would be recoupable
upon failure of the business, the prospective market entrant's risk is low and entry into the
market is likely).

Id.
m Id.
m Id.

110

173

See Jerry Jastrab, Tuition Here is Still a Bargain, N.J. LAW., Aug. 20, 2001 , at I,
LEXIS, News & Business, NJLAWR File (comparing New Jersey state law school tuition
with top tier law school tuition at Columbia, Harvard, and Yale).
174
Alan Jenkins, Losing the Race, AM. LAW., Oct. 4, 2001, at 90-92 (reporting a "virtual
l 00 percent turnover of African-American associates" at a major law firm that had once
employed black lawyers in relatively high numbers). Jenkins indicates that the reasons for
the slow progress of African Americans in law firms included "race-related barriers to
obtaining challenging work," lack of direct client contact, and inadequate mentoring. Id. at
92.
175 The Supreme Court has recognized the pernicious effect of barriers to entry in the
context of disparate impact theory. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971) ("[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups
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The housing market provides a similar example of the effects of
discrimination. A prospective black homebuyer sizes up the housing market,
and sees that he must spend $300,000 to purchase a home in a nice
neighborhood with good schools and low crime rates. Under normal
circumstances, our homebuyer could assume that the value of his house would
appreciate over time. 176 Thus, assuming he could get a home loan, there would
be no particular barrier to his entry to his preferred neighborhood. Assume,
however, that our homebuyer's move to the .area might begin a cycle of
neighborhood transition, and white families deserted the area as more black
families moved in.177 As a result, the value of our homebuyer's home might
fail to appreciate---or might even depreciate-in value. 178 Here, the mere
potential for race-based results injects risk into the prospective homebuyer's
investment and might deter the family's entry into the market.
Next, advertising and promotion can also act as a barrier to entry in a
marketplace. 179 The effects of advertising can be cumulative, resulting in high
levels of customer loyalty to brands over time. Thus, "established firms may
have a distinct advantage over new entrants." 18 Furthermore, advertising may
create brand loyalty, thus increasing barriers to entry. 181 When brand loyalty

°

and are unrelated to measuring job capability."). However, the term "barrier" in disparate
impact theory is typically used to describe static, easily identifiable and eradicable structures
rather than to describe the role of anti-competitive conduct in erecting and maintaining a
variety of barriers to entry. The antitrust thematic vocabulary thus takes us beyond the
disparate impact conception of barriers by helping us to understand the underlying group
conduct driving the erection and maintenance of ongoing barriers to entry in the market.
176
OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 153, at 108-09 (noting that value of an average
residential property tripled from 1970 to 1980, providing homeowners a significant
opportunity to accumulate wealth through home equity).
177
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1965, 1985-88 (2000). Bell and Parchomovosky describe "Schelling's tipping model." Id.
at 1985 (crediting the model to Thomas C. Schelling). Schelling's tipping model presumes
that white residents have varying levels of racial tolerance. Id. Thus, when the first black
person enters a neighborhood, only the most intolerant whites depart. Id. Then, those
vacancies are filled by more blacks causing those whites that are only marginally tolerant to
leave. Id. at 1985-86. This phenomenon repeats creating a tipping effect that drives more
and more whites out of the neighborhood. Id.
178
OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 153, at 147 ("[W]hites pay a premium to live in
homogeneous neighborhoods, but their property appreciates at an enhanced rate. While this
may mean that blacks find relative housing 'bargains' in segregated communities, their
property does not appreciate as much.").
179
HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 529.
180
Id. Hovenkamp explains that if marketing has a "cumulative effect," then the firm
that has been advertising in the market for a long period will have a distinct advantage over
the newcomer. Id. Furthermore, advertising is an example of sunk cost because it is not
recoverable if the firm fails. Id.
181
ROBERT E. MCAULIFFE, ADVERTISING, COMPETITION & PUBLIC POLICY: THEORIES AND
NEW EVIDENCE 7 (I 987).
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exists, "an entering firm must overcome the preference consumers have for
established brands." 182 For example, "Disney has become synonymous in
consumers' minds with good, clean family entertainment. 183 Over time,
consumers have developed brand loyalty to Disney products and services,
because Disney has consistently promoted and delivered a certain image. 184
This brand loyalty saves consumers from expending energy and resources in
researching a new brand, because they know they can safely choose a product
from Disney. 185 This strong brand loyalty can act as a barrier to entry for a
newer entrant into the market. For example, if a new competitor wanted to
launch a product competitive to a Disney product, it would have to spend
significant resources in marketing and promoting that product. 186
Now let us imagine a top university or professional school as a similar
"brand," such as the "brand" of Harvard, Yale, or Brown. Over time, these
universities have consistently promoted and delivered a certain product:
highly-educated, desirable entrants into the work force. 187 If we consider
employers as the consumers of this "product," we begin to see how brand
loyalty acts in this context. Top employers know they can safely choose an
employee from a brand-name university. Over time, employers develop strong
brand loyalty, so that they favor recruits from a select number of universities
and graduate schools. 188 Similarly, decision-makers in corporations can be
seen as exhibiting brand loyalty when they purchase other knowledge-based
products and services. If a CEO of a corporation requires the services of a

182
McAuliffe explains that overcoming a competitor's brand loyalty may require a new
entrant to advertise more than incumbent firms or offer lower prices, both of which reduce
potential profits. id.
183
Chiranjeev Kohli & Lance Leuthesser, Brand Equity: Capitalizing on intellectual
Capital, IVEY Bus. J., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 75, 79 ("Powerful brands, like Coca-cola and
Disney, have developed countless opportunities to extend the brand to products and places
that fit the family, fun, wholesome and nostalgic values these brands symbolize."); see
Kevin Lane Keller, Building Consumer-Based Brand Equity, MARKETING MGMT., July-Aug.
2001, at 15.
184
See, e.g., Disney Interactive, Into Networks to Launch Disney interactive Channel
Over Broadband, Bus. WIRE, June 19, 2000, LEXIS, News & Business, BWIRE File; Dave
McNary, Embattled Disney Finds Core Strength, DAILY NEWS L.A., Oct. 18, 1999, LEXIS,
News & Business, LAD File (reporting on Walt Disney Co. ' s poor stock performance
despite the considerable strength of Disney's brand loyalty).
185 See Jaishankar Ganesh, Mark J. Arnold, & Kristy E. Reynolds, Understanding the
Customer Base of Service Providers: An Examination of the Differences Between Switchers
and Stayers, 64 J. MARKETING 65, 69 (2000).
186 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 529-30; MCAULIFFE, supra note 181, at 7.
187
See Della Bradshaw, Survey-Business Education 2000, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan.
24, 2000, at 1.
188
Paul William Kingston & James G. Clawson, Getting on the Fast Track: Recruitment
at an Elite Business School, in THE HIGH STATUS TRACK: STUDIES OF ELITE SCHOOLS AND
STRATIFICATION 231, 244-49 (Paul William Kingston & Lionel S. Lewis eds., 1990).
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management consulting firm, he may exhibit brand loyalty to McKinsey,
because the "brand" of McKinsey stands for a particular level of quality and
attributes. 189
At this point, one might ask what is wrong with brand loyalty, if the product
or service delivers what it stands for. The aim is not to show that there is
something necessarily wrong with this shorthand decision-making process.
This analogy merely shows how brand loyalty can establish barriers to entry
for minority group members. If well-established brands through which
important business, governmental, and legal transactions take place are
controlled by white individuals, whiteness itself becomes synonymous with the
strength of those brands, further serving to enhance the prestige associated
with being white. The simultaneous power-strengthening nature of this
relationship is similar to the "positive feedback loop" identified by Daria
Roithmayr in the context of law school admissions. 190 This does not mean as a
theoretical matter that black individuals cannot break into these elite schools or
employers; in fact, many have done just that. 191 It does mean, however, that as
a structural issue, brand loyalty to these elite institutions can act as a
systematic bar to minority advancement.
Finally, government regulations and licensing requirements can also create
barriers to entry. 192 The classic example is a regulatory monopoly, in which
the government licenses a limited number of players to provide a good or
service, such as electricity or gas. Such regulation creates a barrier to entry
because it would be difficult-if not impossible-for a new player to enter this
market. 193 Extensive regulation and licensing requirements short of monopoly
creation can also create barriers to entry by raising the cost of doing business,
particularly for small firms. 194 The paradigmatic example, of course, is the
prior system of state-mandated segregation, which functioned to create a clear
barrier to entry to minority competitors and still has ramifications for
competition in employment today. I argue that this barrier to entry, which can
be seen in many areas, has functioned overtime to allow whites to secure unfair
advantages which they still enjoy today. Affirmative action programs can be
understood in many cases as an attempt to disrupt that cycle, allowing for fair
competition for access to benefits. The next part will examine these dynamics
in three different markets- housing, education, and employment.

189
See David Haigh, Making Your Mark, ACCOUNTANCY, May 3, 2000, at 30; John A.
Byrne, The McKinsey Mystique, Bu s . WK., Sept. 20, 1993, at 66, LEXIS, News & Business,
MWP File (analyzing brand marketing of the " Big Five" accounting firms) .
190
Roithmayr, supra note 10, at 754.
19 1
See, e.g. , Jenkins, supra note 174, at 90 (discussing one major firm ' s effort to hire
black attorneys).
192
HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 530.
193
Id. at 530-31.
194 Id.
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Ill. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS UNDERLYING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES:
EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION, AND HOUSING

We now examine three recent cases that illustrate the competitive dynamics
discussed above. These three cases are important on a deeper level because
they represent an effort on the part of government to ameliorate or guard
against discrimination in three vitally important areas of our society:
employment, education and housing. That government has intervened (or has
been forced to intervene) in these cases is no accident. Employment, education
and housing form an interlocking web of sources of social and economic
power.
If we look closely at the nature and history of the dispute in each case, we
see a core struggle among socially and racially defined groups for economic
resources, educational advantages, and beneficial employment opportunities.
Each translates into status and power. These cases can also be viewed as
demonstrations of intergroup conflict, and of government's attempt to mediate
contests for social and economic benefits among groups with conflicting, often
incompatible, agendas. Thus, these cases also illustrate the ways in which
groups compete in the real world for social and economic benefits.
Furthermore, the cases demonstrate some of the techniques used by group
members to secure and maintain competitive advantage in particular contests.
Unfortunately, the courts evaluating these cases have ignored these
underlying realities. This is consistent with the notion that courts as
adjudicative bodies are ill-equipped to deal with societal discrimination; thus,
the courts' focus on specific instances of identified discrimination and
insistence on particularized proof in affirmative action cases. 195 The difficulty,
however, is that these determinations have prevented other governmental
actors from implementing affirmative action plans which seek to level the
playing field so that members of these racially and socially defined groups can
compete on a more equal footing.
195 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
297, 320 (1997):
It is an axiom of modern constitutional scholarship that, when reviewing the actions of
the democratically selected branches, the courts are better suited to evaluation of the
means by which governments accomplish their purposes than the ends they choose to
pursue. Gerald Gunther articulated this position twenty-five years ago, and other
scholars have made similar arguments. Indeed, this impulse appears to underlie much
of the modern criticism of judicial "balancing." The reasoning underlying this
conclusion is quite simple, and is tied to Alexander Bickel's concept of the "countermajoritarian difficulty." Simply put, the idea is that in a democracy, the choice of what
ends government should pursue, and the evaluation of the importance of those ends,
should be exercised by elected representatives.
(internal citations omitted); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 16 (1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 1-9 (1980); David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government
Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REv. 1521,
1525-28 ( 1992).
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This conundrum brings into stark relief an und~rlying problem presented by
the current direction of affirmative action doctrine: courts' institutional
constraints should not be made to constrain other governmental actors. That is,
just because courts may be ill-equipped to deal with more wide-spread
discrimination occurring between socially and racially defined groups within
our society, it does not follow that Congress or some other governmental actor
should be foreclosed from formulating a policy that promotes fair competition
among rival groups.
Each of these cases illustrates the Court's traditional approach to equal
protection, in which it adheres to the individualist discriminatory framework as
key to finding a violation. As noted earlier, this approach has reached its apex
in the Court's affirmative action doctrine, which protects the rights of
individuals in a way that trumps the interests of blacks and other minority
group members. 196 Our current equal protection doctrine treats all racial
classifications, whether benign or invidious, as equally suspect. 197 Thus, strict
scrutiny will be applied to affirmative action programs challenged under equal
protection principles. 198
Strict scrutiny, when applied in the affirmative action context, requires that
the governmental actor demonstrate that its affirmative action program is
justified by a compelling governmental interest, and that the program is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 199 There are two potential compelling
interests to which governments can point in justifying affirmative action
programs. The first is diversity. Diversity was first offered as a "substantial"
state interest in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.200 In Bakke,
the plurality of the Court invalidated an affirmative action program at the
Medical School of the University of California at Davis. 201 Justice Powell
provided the swing vote and in his opinion noted that fostering diversity in
academia was "clearly a constitutionally permissible goal."202 Nevertheless,
Powell concluded that the strict quota system employed in the program at
issue, was an impermissible means in attaining this goal.2°3 This portion of

196

See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) [hereinafter
Adarand III] (stressing that the Equal Protection Clause protects groups and any
governmental action that uses race classifications will be "subjected to detailed judicial
scrutiny" to ensure that the action does not harm individuals).
197
See id. at 226 (rejecting "the surface appeal of holding 'benign' classifications to a
lower standard [of scrutiny]").
198
See id. at 227 (holding that all racial classifications, however benign, must be judged
with strict scrutiny); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(asserting that strict scrutiny is necessary to "'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race").
199
See Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 227.
200
438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978).
201
Id. at 319-20.
202
Id. at 311-12.
203
Id. at 314-15.
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Powell's opinion, however, garnered no support from the other members of the
Court,204 and since Bakke it is not at all clear that diversity still forms the basis
of a compelling government interest. 205
The second and more promising candidate is the government's desire to
alleviate the present effects of either present or past discriminatory conduct. 206
The problem is that while the "present effects" interest is still technically valid,
the government will usually encounter significant proof hurdles in its effort to
make such a showing because the governmental actor usually cannot show that
it is responsible for whatever yawning chasm it seeks to rectify by virtue of the
affirmative action plan. 207 Similarly, notwithstanding the fact that the
government may attempt to justify its affirmative action plan by pointing to
private discriminatory conduct that it has aided and abetted and which
continues to disable minority group members, again the proof problems remain
significant (although perhaps not insurmountable).208
Moreover, even if the government can convince the court that its affirmative
action plan ameliorates the present effects of past discriminatory conduct, it

204

Id. at 269-72 (describing the disposition of the Court).
The Sixth Circuit recently confronted the constitutionality of an affirmative action
program at the University of Michigan Law School. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732
(6th Cir. 2002). The plan conformed to Justice Powell 's suggestion in Bakke by considering
race as a "plus" factor in determining admission to the law school. Id. at 746. Citing Bakke,
the court held that student body diversity is a compelling state interest. Id. at 744 (finding
also that the plan, as designed, was narrowly-tailored to achieve that purpose). Even
bolstered by the Sixth Circuit's opinion, however, diversity is unlikely to achieve much
support from the Court outside the area of education.
206
See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499, 511 (1989)
(invalidating a plan designed to aid minority-owned contractors because it was not designed
to remedy specific instances of discrimination in the industry); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (striking down a union contract that limited minority
layoffs because the city could show no instances of prior discrimination by the
governmental unit involved); see also Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 273-74 (5th Cir.
2000) [hereinafter "Hopwood 1/1'1 (stating that the government may "use racial preferences
under particular circumstances to remedy the effects of past discrimination").
207 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 953-54 (5th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter
Hopwood II]. The panel in Hopwood II invalidated an affirmative action program at the
University of Texas because there was no specific evidence that the university had engaged
in past discrimination. Id. at 954. The court held that evidence of discrimination in Texas
schools dating back to the parents and grandparents of today's students was insufficient. Id.
at 953-54.
208
See Ayres & Vars, supra note 139, at 1611-12. Ayres and Vars suggest that the
Supreme Court has recognized a valid state interest in remedying private discrimination. Id.
at 161 I. In Croson, Justice O'Connor wrote, "It would seem equally clear, however, that [a
state] has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own
legislative jurisdiction." 488 U.S. at 491-92. Accordingly, Ayres and Vars read Croson as
requiring that affmnative action merely be limited to the market-public or private-in
which past discrimination occurred. See Ayres & Vars, supra note 139, at 1612-13.
205
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will likely falter at the second step of the strict scrutiny test, narrow tailoring.
The government will often be required to show that there is no less restrictive
alternative than the one used. 209 The determination to apply strict scrutiny to
affirmative
action
programs,
Justice
O'Connor's
admonitions
notwithstanding, 210 usually ends in the predictable determination that such
programs are unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection law.
Given this, "classic" affirmative action programs, such as where minority
students are admitted to a state school using a separate and arguably lower
admission standard, have recently been struck down in the federal courts. 211
Less visible, however, is the fact that courts are also deciding cases that do not
involve the kind of preferences normally associated with affirmative action
programs in the classic sense. Nevertheless, these courts are striking the
challenged programs down as analogous to disfavored affirmative action plans
and therefore violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, of four recent
federal appellate cases dealing with affirmative action and affirmative actionlike programs, in only one did the court uphold the program at issue- and,
ironically, that was the one case that involved a "true" affirmative action
program. The other cases, as I will discuss in some detail, did not involve the
kind of preference we normally associate with a classic affirmative action
program, but the courts in those cases struck down the programs anyway.
The following is an outline of the courts' approaches in the three
affirmative action-like cases, MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Association v. Federal
Communications Commission, 212 Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public
Schools, 213 and Walker v. City of Mesquite. 214 The fundamental problem with
the courts' analysis in those cases was the failure to fully and adequately
consider the nature and scope of the compelling governmental interest that the
government had advanced to justify the "affirmative action-like" program at
issue. As a result, the government faces the added difficulty of demonstrating
that it (or a private entity that it has aided or abetted) is responsible for the
disparity which the affirmative action program seeks to rectify. The courts'
failure to adequately consider the nature of the compelling interest at stake
magnifies the proof problem that the government will encounter as it attempts
to justify why it has taken race-conscious action in a particular circumstance.

209

See Adarand Ill, 515 U.S. at 229, 237-38.
See id. at 23 7 (attempting to dispel the belief that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory,
fatal in fact").
211
See, e.g., Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 953-54 (invalidating an affirmative action program
at the University of Texas). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 752 (6th Cir. 2002)
(upholding the constitutionality of a University of Michigan affirmative action program).
212
236 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
213 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999).
214
169 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1999).
210
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Competition in Employment: MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Association v.
Federal Communications Commission

A.

Because the case concerns access to employment, competitive dynamics are
at the heart of MD/DC/DE Broadcasters in a very fundamental way.
Broadcast licensees, who are regulated by the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"), historically hired primarily white candidates for
employment. Insiders, who were white (and generally, men), controlled access
to these jobs by controlling the flow of information about job openings. Over
time, this control resulted in a structure that favored white applicants at the
expense of black applicants (and other minority group members). The FCC's
attempt to disrupt this system, and the courts' shortsighted analysis of the
FCC's attempts, are the focus ofmy discussion.
In MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, fifty broadcasters argued that an FCC Equal
Employment Opportunity ("EEO") rule requiring licensees to engage in "broad
outreach" in employment recruiting efforts violated equal protection principles
because it granted a preference to women and minorities.215 The D.C. Circuit
held the FCC's EEO rule unconstitutional because it "put official pressure
upon broadcasters to recruit minority candidates." 2 16 In order to place this
decision in its proper context, some background on the origin of the EEO rule
and the prior challenges to it is necessary.

1.

Origins of the FCC's EEO "Broad Outreach" Rules

The FCC licenses broadcasters, and regulates certain aspects of its licensees'
businesses. 217 Since broadcasters benefit from a license to use the broadcast
spectrum-considered to be owned by the public-the FCC requires
broadcasters to further the public interest. 21 8 Dating back to the late 1960' s,
the FCC determined that "discriminatory employment practices by a broadcast
licensee are incompatible with operation of the public interest." 219 Yet, at the
same time, the FCC expressed concern that simply prohibiting overt
discrimination was not sufficient to ensure equal employment opportunity at
broadcast stations.220 Thus, there was a need for a regulatory solution that
recognized that "schools, training institutions, recruitment and referral sources
215

236 F.3d at 15.

21 6

Id.

2 17 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (establishing the FCC and charging it with
regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communications by wire and radio).
2 18 Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination
in Their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766, 768-69 (11 7-9) (1968) (memorandum
opinion and order) (asserting that the FCC may only grant broadcast authorization if it
serves the public' s best interests).
2 19 Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination
in Their Employment Practices, 18 F.C.C.2d 240, 240 (1 1) (1969) (report and order)
(adopting a nondiscrimination rule).
220
Id. at 242-43 (1 5).
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follow[ed] the pattern set by industry," and that such sources did "not normally
supply job applicants regardless of race, color, religion or national origin
unless asked to do so by employers."221 Consequently, in 1970, the FCC
promulgated equal opportunity regulations that prohibited broadcast licensees
from engaging in invidious discrimination and required licensees to adopt
affirmative action programs intended to ensure equal employment
opportunities for women and minorities within each licensee's labor
hierarchy. 222 Over time, the FCC enhanced the importance of recruitment to
licensees' affirmative action programs, and required "broad outreach" to attract
qualified women and minorities. 223 The FCC then promulgated regulations
that required licensees to "seek out sources likely to refer female and minority
applicants for employment, to track the source of each referral, and to record
the race and sex of each applicant and of each person hired. "224 The FCC
would then take into account data revealing an under-representation of women
and minorities in the licensee's labor hierarchy (as compared to the local
workforce) when considering whether to renew the broadcaster's license. 225
2.

Challenging the FCC's "Broad Outreach" Rules: Lutheran Church
Missouri Synod v. Federal Communications Commission

In 1998, an FCC licensee challenged these regulations in Lutheran ChurchMissouri Synod v. F. C. C. 226 In Lutheran Church, the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia ruled that the FCC's EEO rules violated equal protection
principles. 227 This was because, although the EEO rules required raceconscious outreach and reporting as opposed to race-conscious hiring, an
"underrepresentation" of minority group members within a licensee's labor
hierarchy could trigger "intense EEO review." 228 Consequently, the D.C.
221
Id. at 243 (1 5) (quoting COMM. FOR Gov'T CONTRACTS, PATTERN FOR PROGRESS 14
(1960)).
222
Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination
in their Employment Practices, 23 F.C.C.2d 430, 430-31 (fl 1-2) (1970) (report and order).
223 Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Equal Employment
Opportunity in the Broadcast Radio and Television Services, 4 F.C.C.R. 1715, 1715-16 (11
5-14) (1989) (memorandum opinion and order); Review of the Commission's Broadcast and
Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and Policies and Termination of the EEO
Streamlining Proceeding, 15 F.C.C.R. 2329, 2377 (1 115) (2000) [hereinafter Report &
Order] (describing the EEO's goal of attaining "broad outreach" to all segments of society).
224
MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
22s Id.
226

141 F.3d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 349-55. But see Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998
WIS. L. REV. 1395, 1447-50 (arguing that Lutheran Church was wrongly decided because
the EEO rule at issue was not a "preference" for the purpose of triggering strict scrutiny
review).
228
Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 353. The FCC's EEO rules with respect to women
were not challenged in the case. Id. at 351 n.9.
227
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Circuit ruled that the EEO rules requiring broad outreach in recruitment
pressured licensees to hire minorities so as to avoid the specter of a
"governmental audit."229 The problem from the court's perspective was that
the EEO regulations "certainly influence ultimate hiring decisions. "230 Thus,
the court characterized the EEO rule as a racial classification and applied strict
scrutiny review. 231 Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the FCC's interest in
fostering diverse programming was not sufficiently compelling to support the
EEO rules, and that the rules were not narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. 232
3.

The FCC's Revised Outreach Efforts

In 2000, as a consequence of the Lutheran Church ruling, the FCC adopted
a new EEO rule that attempted to balance the desire for effective and
meaningful recruitment of minorities and women with the constraints imposed
by the court in Lutheran Church. 233 In adopting this new rule, the FCC
concluded that "the record before us confirms our view that broad outreach
efforts to ensure that all segments of the population, including minorities and
women, are aware of broadcast employment opportunities are of crucial
importance to the goals established by Congress of deterring unlawful
discrimination and fostering diversity of programming. " 234 The new rule
required licensees to widely disseminate information about employment
opportunities.235 Licensees were provided with two options; selection of either
would satisfy the licensees' obligations under the new rule. 236 Option A was
titled the "Supplemental Recruitment Program."237 Under Option A, a licensee
employing more than ten employees was required to engage in at least four
approved recruitment initiatives over a two-year period, including participation
in a job fair, co-sponsoring a job fair with women and minority groups in the
business and professional community, participation in a broadcast scholarship
program, or creating a broadcast internship program. 238 Option A did not
require the licensee to report the race and sex of job applicants or interviewees
to the FCC. 239
Option B, the "Alternative Recruitment Program," provided the licensee
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236

231
238

Id. at 353-54.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 354-56.
Report & Order, supra note 223, at 2330-31 (i/ l)
Id. at 2366 (ii 79).
Id. at 2332-33 (i/ 7).
Id. at 2354-65 (ii 78).
Id.

Id. ; see MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(providing complete list of qualifying recruitment initiatives).
239
See MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 17.
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with discretion to design its own outreach program. 240 Such discretion was
conditioned on the licensee's ability to "demonstrate that it is widely
disseminating information concerning job vacancies by analyzing the
recruitment sources, race, ethnicity and gender of the applicants by its
recruitment efforts."241 Licensees selecting Option B were required to report
annually the recruitment source, race, and gender of each job applicant. 242 A
licensee could be required to modify its outreach program to enhance its
inclusiveness where the "data collected does not confirm that notifications are
reaching the entire community." 243 The FCC emphasized that, in monitoring
the applicant pool data, there would be no requirement of proportionality. 244
Finally, all licensees were also required to file an Annual Employment
Report that disclosed the race and sex of each of its employees. 245 In contrast
to the EEO rule challenged in Lutheran Church, however, information about
the race and gender of licensees' employees would be used "only to monitor
industry trends and not to screen renewal applications or to assess compliance
with its EEO obligations."246
4.

Another Challenge to "Broad Outreach": MD/DC/DE Broadcasters v.
FCC

In 2001, in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, for the second time in less than three
years, the D.C. Circuit held the FCC's EEO rule unconstitutional. 247 But
where the constitutional infirmity in Lutheran Church centered on the rule's
pressure on broadcasters "to grant some degree of preference to minorities in
hiring,"248 in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, the rule impermissibly pressured
stations to recruit minorities and women. 249
In reaching its conclusion, the court viewed Option A and Option B very
differently. Option A, standing alone, was constitutionally sound because
licensees were free to choose outreach and recruitment measures that did not

240
Report & Order, supra note 233 , at 2375 ('If 104) (purportedly addressing
broadcasters that requested more flexibility in designing outreach programs).
241
Id. at 2365 ('If 78).
242 Id.
243

Id. at 2375 ('If 104).
Id. at 2378-79 ('If 120) (maintaining that, although the numbers of minorities and
women in the applicant pools need not be proportionate to the that of the work force, "few
or no females or minorities in a broadcaster's applicant pools may be one indication (and
only one indication) that the station's outreach efforts are not reaching the entire
community").
245
MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
246
Report & Order, supra note 233, at 2332 ('If 6).
247
236 F.3d at 15-16.
248
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. F.C.C., 141 F.3d 344, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(emphasis added).
249
MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 18-19.
244
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"place a special emphasis upon the presence of women and minorities in the
target audience. "250 Thus, under Option A, there was no "pressure" on
broadcasters to recruit women or minorities. 251 However, the court held that
Option B "create[d] pressure to focus recruiting efforts upon women and
minorities in order to induce more applications from those groups."252 The
court said that Option B created "pressure" because the FCC investigated
Option B licensees who reported receiving few applications from women or
minority group members. 253 From the court's perspective, the credible threat
of agency investigation formed a powerful inducement to conform to FCC
commands. 254 Indeed, the court went one step further, suggesting that the real
reason for the agency's focus on the race and gender of job applicants was the
FCC's interest in particular employment outcomes, rather than in ensuring that
the appropriate recruitment and outreach efforts were undertaken. 255
The D.C. Circuit interpreted Supreme Court precedent as requiring courts to
apply strict scrutiny to any "racial classification" (e.g., racially-targeted
recruitment) that could be understood as treating the races unequally. 256 Did
Option B subject the races to "unequal treatment?" The D.C. Circuit held that
it did because the FCC rule required licensees to use limited recruiting
resources to attract additional minority candidates. 257 This requirement created
an inequality because white male candidates-who, presumably, would have
otherwise learned of employment opportunities-would be precluded from
learning of those opportunities as a result of the EEO rule. 258 Thus, the
Commission's directive would deprive white male candidates of an
"opportunity to compete simply because of their race." 259 Consequently, the

250
251
252
253
254
255

Id. at 19.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.

Id. ("Were ['broad outreach'] the Commission's only goal, then it would scrutinize
the licensee's outreach efforts, not the job applications those efforts generate.").
256 Id. at 20. While the broadcasters did argue that the FCC's EEO rule violated the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because it
granted a preference to women, the court did not rule conclusively on the question of the
rule's constitutionality as applied to gender preferences. Instead, the court stated that while
the EEO rule granted a "preference" to women candidates, the application of intermediate
scrutiny in this instance might allow the rule to "survive where the same regulation fails
with respect to minorities." Id. at 23 . The court struck down the rule in its entirety,
however, on the theory that removing all references to minorities, while leaving the
regulation intact with respect to women would "severely distort the Commission's program
and produce a rule strikingly different from any the Commission has ever considered." Id.
257 Id. at 20-21
258
Id. at 21.
259 Id.
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court applied strict scrutiny just as it had in Lutheran Church. 260
As discussed below in more detail, 261 the court did not perform a full-blown
compelling governmental interest analysis. The FCC had argued that the EEO
rule was supported by its interest in remedying the effects of past
discrimination and in preventing discrimination from occurring in the future. 262
The court gave short-shift to that argument, first stating that "the
Government's remedial interest is compelling only with respect to 'identified
discrimination,"' then noting that it need not reach the issue at all because the
EEO rule was not narrowly tailored to achieve the interests asserted. 263
The Court replayed this "identified discrimination" theme in its narrow
tailoring analysis. The difficulty was that the EEO rule was not premised on a
"predicate finding" that any specific broadcaster had discriminated in the past
or would do so in the future. 264 At any rate, the court also found fault with
Option B's requirement that licensees report the race of all job applicants. 265
From the court's perspective, such a requirement simply was not narrowly
tailored "to further the Commission's stated goal of non-discrimination in the
broadcast industry. " 266
5.

MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Revisited: Through the Lens oflntergroup
Competition for Employment Opportunities

In MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, the D.C. Circuit failed to appreciate that group
competition for access to employment opportunities formed the essential
backdrop of the dispute in the case. Reframed from this perspective, the case
presented two central questions: should dominant players continue to enjoy
privileged access to information about employment opportunities, and should
those dominant players be permitted to lock-out other competitors? If the D.C.
Circuit had analyzed the case from this competition perspective, the outcome
260

Id.; Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. F.C.C., 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
See infra notes 281-87 and accompanying text.
262
MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 21.
263 Id. (citing Shawv. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,909 (1996)).
264 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 235 F.3d at 21 ("Option B places pressure upon each
broadcaster to recruit minorities without a predicate finding that the particular broadcaster
discriminated in the past or reasonably could be expected to do so in the future.").
265
Id. at 22.
266
Id. The D.C. Circuit's determination was inconsistent with the Eleventh Circuit's
view on the standard of review for outreach programs. See Allen v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 164 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that strict scrutiny is generally
inapplicable to outreach efforts), vacated, 216 F .3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Sussman
v. Tanoue, 39 F. Supp. 2d 13, 27 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that FDIC's affirmative action
program was "conscious of race but devoid of ultimate preferences," and therefore not
subject to strict scrutiny). However, other courts have been more circumspect in their
treatment of outreach programs. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of White House,
191 F.3d 675, 692 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Outreach efforts may or may not require strict
scrutiny.").
261
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could have been completely different. This approach would have allowed the
court to perceive more accurately the nature of the underlying problemspecifically, how best to mediate the conflicting goals of members of racially
and socially defined groups that are competing in the market for employment
opportunities.
Let us now retrace the court's analysis, using these two central questions as
our guideposts. The court ruled that Option B created "pressure" to recruit
minorities thereby according them a preference over white male candidates;
thus, it embodied a "racial classification" that must be subject to strict scrutiny
review." 267 One response to that argument, however, is that strict scrutiny
should not even have been applied in the case because the rational basis test
was the more appropriate standard of review.268 Indeed, the FCC argued that
the EEO rule should not be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny because
"affirmative outreach," rather than creating a racial or gender preference for
the job, simply expanded the applicant pool. 269 An individual, the FCC
maintained, has no constitutional right "to compete against fewer rivals for a
job."27 From this perspective, the EEO rule was pro-competitive and intended
to disrupt entrenched, exclusive informational networks. Thus, the FCC
correctly, although unsuccessfully, argued that equal protection principles were
not implicated. 271
First, the court was incorrect in viewing Option B as applying "pressure" on
licensees such that strict scrutiny must necessarily apply. In fact, licensees
were always free to select Option A, which did not pressure licensees to recruit
women and minorities. 272 Option B was instituted at the broadcasters' behest,
in an effort to provide licensees with "discretion to design an outreach program
that is responsive to the needs of the broadcaster's organization and the local
community."273 The "price" of discretion was a requirement that licensees
demonstrate the inclusiveness of their program. 274 Option A was always
available to licensees who did not wish to design their own outreach programs

°

267

MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 18-21.

268

Under a rational basis test, the court decides only whether a challenged measure is
rationally related to some legitimate government interest. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 ( 1955).
269
MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 20.
210
21 1

Id.
Id.

272 Id. at 18-19 ("[W]e do not believe that the Broadcasters are meaningfully pressured
under Option A to recruit women and minorities.").
273 See Report & Order, supra note 233, 2374 ('I) 104) (acknowledging that a "number of
broadcasters" had pushed the FCC for the flexibility to individually design outreach
programs).
274 Id. (requiring broadcasters electing Option B to collect data on their recruiting sources
and subsequent pool of applicants).
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or report on the race and gender compositions of their applicant pools. 275
Second, the D.C. Circuit was incorrect in ruling that licensees were
pressured because the "Commission promises to investigate any licensee that
reports 'few or no' applications from women or minorities."276 In so ruling,
the D.C. Circuit also expressed skepticism that recruitment and outreach truly
animated the EEO rule, suggesting instead that the rule was actually intended
to guarantee proportional representation of minorities and women at broadcast
stations. 277 While it is true that the lack of minority or women in a licensee's
applicant pool could trigger a Commission investigation, the Commission
described the potential investigation in much different, and far more equivocal,
terms:
[I]n the case of those broadcasters who utilize applicant pool data, there is
no requirement that the composition of applicant pools be proportionate
to the composition of the local work force. However, few or no females
or minorities in a broadcaster's applicant pools may be one indication
(and only one indication) that the station's outreach efforts are not
reaching the entire community. The representation of females and
minorities in applicant pools is only one factor that we will look at in
determining whether a broadcaster's outreach program is inclusive. We
may ultimately determine that outreach efforts are reasonably designed to
reach the entire community, even if few females or minorities actually
apply for openings. Conversely, the fact that a sizeable number of
females or minorities have applied for openings will not necessarily
establish the inclusiveness of the station's efforts. Also, we recognize
that an employer cannot control who applies for jobs. The only purpose
of the data: collection is to give the broadcaster, the public, and the
Commission more information by which to monitor the effectiveness of a
station's outreach efforts so that the broadcaster can take appropriate
action to modify its outreach efforts should the information indicate that
they are not reaching the entire community.278
The FCC's statement suggests that applicant pool data was only one factor to
be examined in determining whether the outreach program was inclusive and
that its true concern centered on the effectiveness of the licensee's outreach
and recruitment program rather than on proportional representation. Yet
275

MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 17. Broadcast licensees electing Option A
were not required to report the race, gender, and referral source of applicants. Report &
Order, supra note 233, 2374 (1104). Notwithstanding the Commission's request to sever
Option A from Option B, the court refused and vacated the rule in its entirety on the theory
that severing the options would ''undercut the whole structure of the rule." MD/DC/DE
Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 22.
276
MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 19 (emphasis added).
277
Id. (stating that the "agency with life and death power over the license is interested in
result, not process").
278
Report & Order, supra note 233, at 2378-79 (1120).
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potential sanctions for failing to enact an affirmative outreach program raises a
much larger question: to what extent, if any, is requiring "affirmative
outreach" discriminatory?
The D.C. Circuit ruled that, because licensees were required under Option B
to engage in inclusive outreach, strict scrutiny must apply. 279 Such a
conclusion, however, is clearly premised on the notion that nonminority
applicants are disadvantaged by the EEO rule because they would receive less
information about employment opportunities. Conversely, minorities and
women would receive more opportunities because of it. 280 The difficulty is
that this is exactly the state of affairs the FCC sought to rectify with its EEO
rule but on behalf of women and minorities. The concern, from the FCC's
perspective, was that the status quo maintained a system where minorities and
women were being deprived of an opportunity to compete simply because of
their race. The problem from the D.C. Circuit's perspective, was exactly the
opposite. In this sense, the D.C. Circuit's ruling revealed how hard it is to tell
the difference between affirmative action and nondiscrimination, and implicitly
raised the question of which governmental body is best-suited to make that
determination.
Even assuming that strict scrutiny should have been applied in the case, the
D.C. Circuit court still erred in its application of it.
In MD/DC/DE
Broadcasters, the court never resolved the question of whether the FCC's EEO
rule was supported by a compelling governmental interest. 281 Instead, the
court ruled that it need not resolve that question because "the Broadcasters
argue convincingly that the new EEO rule is not narrowly tailored to further
that interest. " 282 This sealed the fate of the EEO rule. A firm determination
that the rule was animated by a compelling governmental interest would have
changed the court's narrow tailoring analysis by forcing the court to articulate
more clearly why Option B was not narrowly tailored either to remedy the
effects of past discrimination or to prevent future discrimination from
occurring. As it stood, the court's nonexistent compelling governmental
interest analysis dictated the outcome of the narrow tailoring inquiry because
the court was unable to appreciate the nature and extent of the problem the
FCC was attempting to ameliorate. 283 If we take a step back and look at the
compelling governmental interest question through the lens of intergroup

279

MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 18-20.
As the D.C. Circuit put it, "some prospective nonminority applicants who would have
learned of job opportunities but for the Commission's directive now will be deprived of an
opportunity to compete simply because of their race." Id. at 21 .
280

28 1
282

Id.
Id.

283
The D.C. Circuit had condemned the EEO on the narrowly tailored analysis because,
"[q]uite apart from the question of a compelling governmental interest, such a sweeping
requirement is the antithesis of [a] rule narrowly tailored to meet a real problem." Id.
(emphasis added).
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competition, we see quite clearly how the analysis might have changed.
Considering the underlying intergroup competition, the FCC's EEO rule
was clearly justified by a compelling interest. Even if we assume that all
broadcast licensees are private entities, 284 when barriers to obtaining
employment information exist, the government is not foreclosed from directing
its licensees to attempt to remove those barriers. The FCC's EEO rule was an
effort to reduce the discriminatory impact of word-of-mouth recruitment
practices that had functioned as a barrier to entry to the market for employment
at broadcast licensees. 285 These barriers had worked to the advantage of a
particular race and gender in that market, and they had tended to allow for the
perpetuation of a nondiverse workforce.286 The FCC concluded that "word-ofmouth recruitment practices may be inherently discriminatory when minorities
and women are poorly represented on an employer' s staff-particularly when
they are scarce in the management ranks where hiring decisions are made."287
Thus, such word-of-mouth recruitment practices were barriers to entry that
operated to lock-out non-dominant market players.
Because word-of-mouth recruitment both perpetuates the effects of past
discriminatory activity and creates present discrimination by strengthening
exclusionary labor hierarchies, the FCC has a strong interest in clearing these
barriers to entry and creating open competition for employment at federallylicensed broadcast stations. As Professors Ian Ayres and Frederic E. Vars have
persuasively argued, "[w ]hen inaction ('passive,' color-blind behavior) would
tend to maintain racially segregated markets, the government has a compelling
interest to counteract this effect."288
Judged against this background, Option B was also narrowly tailored to
achieve the objective of enhancing outreach to prospective minority
candidates. The difficulty with the D.C. Circuit's approach to the narrow

284

See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-21
(1973) (plurality opinion) (holding that broadcast licensees were private entities for the
purposes of the First Amendment).
285
Report & Order, supra note 233, at 2345 (i! 40).
286
Id. (stating that outreach recruitment was necessary "so that the homogeneous
workforce does not simply replicate itself').
287
Id. For instance, research has shown that informal recruitment networks such as
word-of-mouth recruiting tend to replicate the extant workforce. PHILIP Moss & CHRIS
TILLY, STORIES EMPLOYERS TELL: RACE, SKILL, AND HIRING IN AMERICA 226 (2001). This is
the case because insiders tend to refer potential applicants with whom they enjoy a close
relationship. Id. (quoting a supervisor mentioning that "a lot of people [are] trying to help
members of their family, friends. Get them a job, get them in the company"). Research also
suggests that word-of-mouth recruiting discourages outsiders from applying for jobs even
where there is knowledge of job availability by reaffirming the perception that a particular
firm is dominated by members of a particular group. Id. at 227. In this manner, informal
recruitment networks "amplif[y] the effect of separation between groups," accentuating the
rivalry between socially and racially defined groups. Id.
288
Ayres & Vars, supra note 139, at 1610.
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tailoring inquiry was that it refused to view Option B as addressing the real
problem: the need for effective outreach to women and minority communities.
Instead, the court viewed Option B as a carefully-veiled preference scheme
intended to achieve proportional representation of women and minorities
within the licensee's workforce. 289 This flawed approach grew directly from
the D.C. Circuit's failure to conduct a meaningful compelling governmental
interest inquiry.
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, the FCC's position was that the requirement
of submission of applicant pool data was intended to "give the broadcaster, the
public, and the Commission more information by which to monitor the
effectiveness of a station's outreach efforts."290 Viewing Option Bas an effort
to enhance inclusiveness and to level the playing field for all competitors, it
becomes very difficult to see how a licensee-designed outreach program could
be monitored for effectiveness in the absence of any applicant pool data. In
addition, the FCC's EEO rule as a whole also contained a race-neutral
alternative. Recall that broadcast licensees were always free to choose Option
A, which did not "place a special emphasis upon the presence of women and
minorities in the target audience."291 Option B was triggered only at the
licensee's option. 292 Viewed from this perspective, Option B was narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
This case shows very clearly the competitive dynamics of a particular
market-i.e., the market for employment with the FCC' s broadcast licensees.
By refusing to acknowledge these dynamics, the court turned a blind eye to
systematic anticompetitive conduct, which had created unfair competitive
advantages enjoyed by a particular group. As a result, the court perpetuated
the existing anticompetitive structure rather than allowing the FCC to try to
construct an even playing field.
B.

Competition in Education: Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public
Schools

Education is another key area in which blacks and whites compete for
access to resources. In education, patterns of private discriminatory (and
anticompetitive) conduct-aided and abetted by governmental actors-has
operated to lock-in benefits for whites at the expense of blacks. In Eisenberg
v. Montgomery County Public Schools, a governmental actor attempted to
disrupt this anticompetitive system and was rebuffed by the Fourth Circuit. 293
As we saw in the employment context, the court's failure to analyze the
underlying competitive landscape results in a decision that protects the existing
anticompetitive structure.
289
290
291
292
293

MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 13, 21-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Report & Order, supra note 233, at 2378 (if 120).
MD/DC/DE Broadcasting, 236 F.3d at 19.
Report & Order, supra note 233, at 2374 (i! 104).
197 F.3d 123, 124 (4th Cir. 1999).
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In Eisenberg, a white elementary school student, Jacob Eisenberg, argued
that a school district transfer policy that had prevented his transfer into a
magnet program because of the potential "impact on diversity" was a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. 294 While the district court had denied
Eisenberg's motion for a preliminary injunction that would have compelled his
admittance into the magnet program, the Fourth Circuit granted the injunction
because "such race based governmental actions are presumed to be invalid and
are subject to strict scrutiny."295 Again, some background on the origins of the
transfer policy, and Eisenberg's challenge to it, is in order.
1.

The Montgomery County Public Schools Transfer Policy

Like many other metropolitan areas, Montgomery County, Maryland
experienced significant demographic shifts in the 1970's and the 1980's.
During that time, the number of minority students attending the County's
public schools swelled so that by the 1993-94 school year almost half of the
students attending the county's public schools were minorities. 296 This was an
increase from 1970, when minority students accounted for only eight percent
of the county's school population. 297 Correspondingly, during the same period,
the percentage of students that were white fell from ninety-two percent to fiftyeight percent. 298
In 1977, the county had instituted a magnet schools program "in an attempt
to desegregate areas of the county that at one time were considered most
vulnerable to segregation. " 299 One purpose of the magnet program was to
"attract and retain diverse student enrollment on a voluntary basis to schools
outside the area in which a student lives." 300 Subsequently, Montgomery
County developed a transfer policy, which allowed transfers among schools in
the district based upon five factors, one of which was the "diversity profile" or
racial composition of the transferee school.3° 1 While transfers that adversely
affected diversity were usually denied, white students were not singled out for

294
295

Id. at 125-30.
Id. at I 33.

296
GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 210 (1996) (stating that "(I]n the 1993-94
school year, 42.3 percent of students were members of minority groups").

291

Id.

298

Id. at 387 n.7.
Id. at 209.
Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 125 . While Montgomery County's school system had never

299
300

been the subject of a court order requiring it to desegregate its schools, the system was
segregated prior to the implementation of its voluntary magnet program. Id. ; see also
ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 296, at 207.
301
Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449,451 (D. Md. 1998);
see also ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 296, at 213 (identifying the factors considered in the
calculation of the "diversity profile").
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unfavorable treatment. 302
In the 1998-1999 school year, Jacob Eisenberg sought a transfer to the
Rosemary Hills elementary school in order to take advantage of its magnet
math and science program.303 Jacob's family believed that the transfer was
necessary in order to provide him with the "best opportunity for realizing his
personal and academic potential."304 Jacob's residence would otherwise have
dictated that he attend the Glen Haven Elementary School, which had
experienced a sharp drop in white enrollment in the years immediately
preceding Jacob's transfer request. 305 Montgomery County denied Jacob's
transfer request because of the "impact on diversity" since white enrollment at
Glen Haven had dropped so significantly.306
2.

Eisenberg's Challenge to Montgomery County's Transfer Policy in the
United States District Court

Jacob Eisenberg lost at the district court level because the court was
convinced that a ruling in Eisenberg's favor could "lead to racial isolation
among certain schools in the District."307 In assessing Eisenberg's motion for
a preliminary injunction, the district court began with a strict scrutiny
analysis. 308
Given the race-based nature of Montgomery County's
determination, there was little question that strict scrutiny would apply to its
denial of the transfer request. 309 Montgomery County argued that two interests

302

Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 126. "[A]t some schools, African-Americans are generally not
allowed to transfer out. At other schools, white transfers are for the most part not approved.
At a substantial number of schools, transfers are approved without consideration of the
impact on racial or ethnic makeup of the affected schools." Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at
454 (recapping the school district's argument that the "diversity profile" does not single out
whites).
303 Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 125.
304
Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (quoting the stated reason included on the student's
transfer request form).
305 Id. Jacob was one of nineteen white students seeking a transfer from Glen Haven in
1998, which was consistent with enrollment trends at Glen Haven. Id. Between 1994 and
1998, the percentage of white enrollment at Glen Haven dropped from 38.9 percent to 24. l
percent. Id. In the year that Jacob made his transfer request, Glen Haven had the following
racial breakdown: 24.1 percent of the school's students were white, 40.5 percent were
African-American, 25 percent were Hispanic and 10.1 percent were Asian. Id. Glen
Haven's percentage of white students was far less than the county-wide average which
hovered just over 50 percent. Id.
306 See Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 125 n. l (noting that, absent special circumstances, the
school district refused to permit any white students to transfer out of Glen Haven
Elementary School).
307
See Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 452.
308
See id.
309
See id.
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justified its determination. 310 The first was the desire to promote diversity. 311
With respect to the increasingly controversial question of whether diversity
could form the basis of a compelling governmental interest, the district court
responded affirmatively, ruling "that the diversity interest remains a
compelling governmental interest in the context now being considered."312
The County also attempted to support the transfer denial on a second,
separate rationale. Montgomery County must retain the authority to deny
transfer requests in order to avoid "facilitating through its actions private
conduct that leads to a discriminatory environment."313 Montgomery County's
argument boiled down to a broad assertion that the court must recognize the
reality of "white flight" so that governmental actors would not be forced to
facilitate conduct that would lead to resegregation.
The district court did not shy away from the County's desire to avoid
facilitating segregation. The district court accepted Montgomery County's
assertion, fearing that forcing the County to grant transfer requests would
result in "segregative enrollment patterns that might themselves constitute
violations of the law."314 In reaching this conclusion, the district court reached
back to the Supreme Court's discussion of "passive participation" in City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.315 to unearth an appropriate analogy. 316 In
Croson, the Supreme Court recognized that a governmental actor could take
appropriate steps to prevent "its tax dollars from assisting these organizations
in maintaining a racially segregated construction market."317 For the district
court, Montgomery County faced a similar quandary: without the ability to
deny nonintegrative transfers, the result might well be "extremely low
percentages of minorities, or nonminorities in certain public schools."318
Thus, from the district court's perspective, Montgomery County had a
compelling government interest in avoiding segregative enrollment patterns. 319
Having affirmed the existence of a compelling government interest, the court
considered whether Montgomery County's transfer policy was narrowly

310
311

Id.
Id.

312 Id. at 453. The court discussed Justice Powell's decision in Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978). Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 453 .
Powell argued that diversity in a student body enhances informal learning. Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 312.
313 Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
314 Id.
3l5 488 U.S. 469 (1988).
316 Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
317 Croson, 488 U.S. at 503, quoted in Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
318 Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
319 Id. (maintaining that the Montgomery County School District has a "compelling
interest in not facilitating a discriminatory environment" that would result from segregated
enrollment patterns).

1140

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1089

tailored. The court was persuaded that Montgomery County's policy neither
singled out any particular racial group for disfavored treatment nor used
"quotas."32 Consequently, the district court concluded that, "on balance, the
District's policies have been designed as narrowly as ' possible while still
furthering the District's stated interests. " 321

°

3.

Eisenberg's Challenge to Montgomery County's Transfer Policy in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding
that the County could not consider an applicant's race in granting or denying a
transfer request. 322 The court's analysis mirrored that of the D.C. Circuit in
MD/DC/DE Broadcasters in its approach to the compelling governmental
interest prong of strict scrutiny review. 323 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
"assume[d], without holding . . . that diversity may be ~ compelling
governmental interest," and then proceeded to question whether the transfer
policy was narrowly tailored. 324 As was the case in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters,
without anchoring the court's opinion with a clear examination or
determination that there is a strong compelling interest animating the
governmental action at issue, the outcome of the narrow tailoring analysis is
preordained.
First, in making such an assumption, the Fourth Circuit conveniently
blended the two separate rationales that Montgomery County had originally
put forward to justify the transfer denial.3 25 At the district court level, the
County had put forward both its interest in promoting a diverse student body
and its interest in avoiding the "creation, through District action, of segregative
enrollment patterns that might themselves constitute violations of the law" as
sufficiently compelling to justify the transfer policy. 326
The Fourth Circuit, however, believed these interests to be "one and the
same," thus distilling the two into a single desire to achieve racial diversity. 327
Thus, the Fourth Circuit ignored what the district court had clearly recognized,
that Montgomery County "obviously has a compelling interest in not

320

Id.

321

Id. In deciding whether the policy was narrowly tailored, the district court also found
that, given the goal as articulated, no race-neutral alternatives were available, and that
periodic review of the transfer program would ensure that the transfer policy was "as narrow
as possible." Id. at 454-55.
322 Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 133-34 (4th Cir. 1999).
323 See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text (discussing the court's compelling
interest analysis in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters).
324 Eisenberg, 197- F.3d at 130 (stressing that "[n]o inference may here be taken that we
are of [the] opinion that racial diversity is a compelling government interest").
325 Id.
326
321

Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 452.
Id.
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facilitating a discriminatory environment through state action. " 328 Assuming
without holding that racial diversity was a compelling governmental interest,
the court effectively removed the question of governmental facilitation of
discriminatory private conduct from the case, thereby allowing it to ignore this
difficult issue. The stage was now set for the decisive narrow tailoring
analysis, which allowed the Fourth Circuit to strike down the County's plan.
Once the Fourth Circuit framed the question the way it did-"[Is]
Montgomery County's use of racial classification in its transfer decisions ...
narrowly tailored to the interest of obtaining diversity?" 329-the answer
became practically inevitable. Within the context of the Fourth Circuit's
narrow tailoring analysis, "racial diversity" simply became "nonremedial racial
balancing. " 330 As the court noted, "[Montgomery County's transfer policy] is
mere racial balancing in a pure form, even at its inception."331 The court
believed the transfer policy was aimed merely at "keeping certain percentages
of racial/ethnic groups within each school."332 Such an end, in and of itself,
simply could not be constitutionally sound. 333
This reasoning is simply circular; it amounts to ruling that racial balancing
is unconstitutional because racial balancing is unconstitutional. The court's
reference to prior and controlling Fourth Circuit precedent, however, reveals a
more satisfying answer: racial balancing is per se unconstitutional because it
lacks an adequate factual predicate sufficient to support a narrowly tailored
remedy. 334 At its core, the constitutional infirmity of racial balancing is that it
seeks to achieve a certain racial representation without sufficient proof that the
disparity which occasioned its use is the result of identified discrimination on
the part of either the governmental entity or some private actor whom the
governmental entity has aided or abetted. 335 In this respect, the constitutional

328

329
330

331
332

333

Id. at 454.
Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 131.
See id.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 133. The court reasoned that Montgomery County was engaged in racial
balancing, a practice that the court had previously invalidated. Id. Accordingly,
Montgomery County's rejection of the transfer application was "invalidated because it was
giving effect to an unconstitutional policy." Id.
334
See id. (citing Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir. 1999),
and Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 160 (4th Cir. 1994)).
335 The Fourth Circuit's discussion of the constitutionality of a race-based scholarship
program in Podberesky is instructive on this point:
The district court has approved the use of the Banneker Program to affirmatively admit
African-American students solely on the basis of race until the composition of AfricanAmericans on the University campus reflects the percentage of African-American
Maryland high school graduates who potentially might participate in higher education
at UMCP, without an accurate determination of either the extent to which the present
disparity exists, . . . or the extent to which that disparity flows from past
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infirmity in Eisenberg mirrored that which was discovered in MD/DC/DE
Broadcasters-specifically, the failure to identify specific instances of past
discrimination sufficient to support the race-based program at issue. 336
4.

Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools: Through the Lens of
Intergroup Competition in the Public School System

What if the Fourth Circuit had approached the dispute in Eisenberg with an
eye toward intergroup competition within the context of public education?
There are least two ways in which this approach could have impacted the
court's decision. The first approach would explicitly recognize the importance
of admission to magnet schools. Over the years we have observed a constant
struggle about the meaning of educational equality. These struggles have
taken place in a variety of contexts and across all educational levels, from
elementary school to graduate school.3 37 But at all levels, the disputes were
about more than simply what the content of a particular entry requirement
should be. These fights also had an instrumental quality because admission
into a particular educational institution also determined access to the
significant social and economic advantages that such an education provided.
Recently, an increasing number of suits have challenged the use of race
conscious admissions standards at public schools and in particular have
targeted the use of race as a factor in determining admission to public elite and
"magnet" schools. 338 Eisenberg is firmly part of this new trend.
discrimination . . . . The program thus could remain in force indefinitely based on
arbitrary statistics unrelated to constitutionally permissible purposes . . .. We are thus
of opinion that, as analyzed by the district court, the program more resembles outright
racial balancing than a tailored remedy program. As such, it is not narrowly tailored to
remedy past discrimination. In fact, it is not tailored at all.
Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 160.
336 For an incisive analysis of Eisenberg and two other recent Fourth Circuit public
school cases that arguably " invite a new era of de facto school segregation," see John
Charles Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety and the Resegregation of
Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1719 (2000).
337 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1987) (sustaining a
challenge against an affirmative action plan at a public medical school); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (sustaining a challenge to de jure segregation of public schools);
Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2000) (sustaining a challenge to an
affirmative action plan at a public law school).
338 See, e.g., Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001)
(challenging a magnet school admissions plan that used racial ratios to determine student
assignment); Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch., 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000) (challenging
an interdistrict transfer program intended to reduce racial isolation); Eisenberg v.
Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999) (challenging a race conscious
magnet school transfer policy); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir.
1999) (arguing that lottery admissions system for an alternative kindergarten which took
race into account was unconstitutional); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998)
(challenging the constitutionality of Boston Latin School's race conscious admission
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The second approach would explicitly recognize the reality of "white
flight." From this perspective, the court could have considered the type of
private discriminatory exclusion the transfer plan was intended to prevent or at
least not to facilitate: "white flight" from substantially minority public
schools. 339 From this standpoint, the transfer policy would also be viewed
against the backdrop of intensifying racial segregation in our nation's public
schools. 340 Triggered by "systematic avoidance" of interracial contact, white
migration from urban public schools is a perceptible phenomenon, and public
schools in metropolitan areas are increasingly becoming racially segregated. 341
As Professor Gary Orfield has suggested, "[i]n a society with a rapidly
growing minority population and little stable residential integration, unless
there are successful strategies to stabilize either school or housing integration
or both, there will be a great deal of resegregation and decline in white
enrollment."342 Montgomery's transfer policy, intended to "ensure racial and
ethnic diversity of the schools of the County,"343 was an attempt to prevent
such an outcome and to "equalize integration" across the county. 344
Given these approaches, the underlying dispute in Eisenberg is not simply
about who will be admitted to a particular magnet program. Rather, it revolves
around the question of whether the governmental interest in disrupting patterns
of private discriminatory exclusion which provide manifold advantages to a
dominant group outweighs an individual's interest in having access to a
magnet program. While the district court took cognizance of this by explicitly
recognizing the relationship between the County's actions and "segregative

policy); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224
(W.D. Wash. 2001) (challenging a racial "tiebreaker" for school district's open choice
assignment plan); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass. 2000)
(alleging that a plan intended to eliminate racial isolation within school district was
unconstitutional); Boston Children First v. Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D. Mass. 1999)
(challenging city-wide student assignment plan that used race as a factor in determining
student placement). But see Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d
358 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (addressing a challenge by African-American parents to magnet
school program that capped black student enrollment at a particular level).
339
See Jeffrey R. Henig, Race and Choice in Montgomery County, Maryland, Magnet
Schools, 96 TCHRS. C. REC. 729, 731 (1995) ("[T]he pattern of [transfer] requests in
Montgomery County suggests that-unless aggressively regulated by authorities-the
direction in which choice points may exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, racial
segregation.").
340
See Orfield, supra note 154, at 16, 48.
341
Charles T. Clotfelter, Are Whites Still Fleeing? Racial Patterns and Enrollment Shifts
in Urban Public Schools, 1987-1996, 201. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 199,217 (2001).
342
Orfield, supra note 154, at 8.
343
Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449,454 (D. Md. 1998).
344
See Orfield, supra note 154, at 8 ("[W]hite enrollment is most stable when there are
large school districts that both tend to equalize integration and to deny the possibility of
finding nearby all-white schools.").
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enrollment patterns,"345 the Fourth Circuit declined to do so and glossed over
the intergroup competitive dynamic against which the County acted. In doing
so, the Fourth Circuit left intact the existing structure, built on a foundation of
anti-competitive conduct that continues to lock-out blacks from the resources
and benefits enjoyed by whites.
C.

Competition in Housing: Walker v. City of Mesquite

The market for housing, like the markets for employment and to education,
display clear competitive dynamics. Walker v. City of Mesquite 346 illustrates
the built-in advantages enjoyed by a racially and socially defined group as a
result of prior discriminatory state action. The state's attempts to disrupt this
system are rebuffed by the court in a manner quite similar to those we have
seen in employment and education. Again, the court chose to leave intact a
system built on anti-competitive conduct that has locked-in benefits for one
group at the expense of another.
In Walker, the Fifth Circuit held unconstitutional a remedial order requiring
that newly constructed public housing units be located in predominantly white
neighborhoods in Dallas. 347 The district court based its remedial order on a
judicial finding not only of generations of intentional discrimination in the
Dallas public housing program, but also of recalcitrance on the part of the
responsible government officials in ameliorating the effects of that
discrimination. 348 Walker, like MD/DC/DE Broadcasters and Eisenberg, is not
a "classic" affirmative action case. Again, some background is in order.
1.

The Early Phases of the Walker Litigation

The Walker litigation began in 1985, when minority recipients of federal
housing assistance sued the Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD"), the Dallas Housing Authority ("DHA"), and several Dallas
metropolitan area suburbs for racial discrimination in the administration of a
federal housing assistance program. 349 That litigation resulted in the district
court approving a consent decree in 1987. 350 Two years later, the district court
joined the City of Dallas to the decree and made the city a party in the lawsuit
345

See Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
169 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Walker V].
347 Id. at 975-76.
348 See id. at 976-77 (outlining the procedural history of case); see Walker v. HUD, 734
F. Supp. 1289, 1293 (N.D. Tex. 1989) [hereinafter Walker 11/j ("At any time-yes, at any
time-the City of Dallas could have forced DHA to stop its deliberate policy of strict racial
segregation in low-income public housing in Dallas." (emphasis in original)).
349 Walker v. HUD, 912 F.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Walker JV]. The
suburban communities were later dismissed from the litigation after they agreed to
participate in the federal Section 8 program. Id. at 822.
350 Walker V, 169 F.3d at 976.
346
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because the city was a "substantial cause of DHA's deliberate racial
segregation and discrimination in its public housing programs in Dallas."351
In joining the City of Dallas to the decree, the district court canvassed the
history of the DHA and found that, "[t]rom its beginning, the primary purpose
of DHA's public housing program was to prevent blacks from moving into
white areas of this city." 352 The DHA accomplished this through a variety of
methods, including: repeatedly and intentionally siting public housing
developments in "Negro slum areas," 353 yielding to demands from white
property owners that "Negro project[s]" not be sited in white areas; 354
constructing the racially segregated West Dallas project with "separate parks
and commercial areas ... for the separate races,"355 and refusing to allow most
minority tenants to use Section 8 housing assistance certificates that would
have allowed them to secure housing in suburban areas. 356 As a result, blacks
"were purposefully segregated for decades into either Section 8 housing in
minority areas of Dallas or predominantly black housing projects in minority
areas of Dallas."357
The 1987 consent decree required the defendants to demolish and replace
several thousand dilapidated housing units, and to "assist black families joining
the Section 8 program in finding housing in white areas of Dallas."358 The
DHA did not comply, engaging in a long period of recalcitrance and repeatedly
violating the decree. 359 The district court ultimately vacated the 1987 decree
because the remnants of intentional segregation remained, granted summary
judgment on liability for plaintiffs, and entered remedial orders affecting the
DHA and HUD. 360 These remedial orders are the subject of the Walker v. City
of Mesquite. 361 More specifically, the remedial order affecting the DHA, like
351

Walker 111, 734 F. Supp. at 1290 (" Throughout the history of the [Dallas Housing
Authority}, the City has known of DHA 's blatant practices of racial segregation and
discrimination, .. . not only did the City refase to intervene to stop these illegal practices, it
actually participated in this conscious discrimination against minorities in public housing in
Dallas." (emphasis in original)).
352
Id. at 1293.
353 Id.
354

Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1296.
356
Id. at 1300. See generally George Rodrigue, Craig Flournoy and David Tarrant,
Segregation in Dallas: How Integration of Housing Failed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb.
14, 1985, 1985 WL 4017103 (noting that "[ a]ffluent communities in and around Dallas have
slammed their doors" to a federal initiative aimed at developing low income housing in
suburbs and the DHA "has yet to build desperately needed family housing outside
minorities areas").
357
Walker V, 169 F.3d 973,976 (5th Cir. 1999).
358
Id. at 977.
359 Id.
360 Id.
355

361

Id. at 975-76.
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the 1987 consent decree before it, required the DHA to demolish certain public
housing units and replace those units through new construction and Section 8
assistance. 362 Key to the DHA remedial order was the requirement that the
DHA "develop all new public housing units in predominantly white areas until
there are as many units in predominantly white areas as there are in minority
areas. " 363
2.

The Challenge to the Remedial Order

In Walker, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the construction of two forty-unit
public housing projects adjacent to their neighborhoods. 364 The plaintiffs, who
were white, lived in a neighborhood that was more than sixty percent white. 365
They asserted two arguments. First, they argued that they were the victims of
purposeful racial discrimination because the defendants had singled their
neighborhood out to accommodate the new projects on the basis of race. 366
Second, they argued that the siting decision would "inflict specific injury
including decreased property values, increased crime and population density,
environmental problems, and diminished aesthetic values of the
neighborhood." 367 The district court had denied the plaintiffs' request for
injunctive relief, but the Fifth Circuit vacated the remedial order. 368
At the outset, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs that they would be
injured by the proposed construction plan. 369 Why was this the case? The
court opined that the challenged remedial order embodied a racial
classification because "these homeowner's 'whiteness' is one of two
controlling elements which identified the specific sites adjacent to their
neighborhoods for new public housing construction."370 Thus, the very
presence of an explicit racial classification within the remedial order generated
standing to sue. 371 With this determination, the Fifth Circuit confirmed that the

362

Id. at 977.
Id. The remedial order defined "predominantly white area" as any area with less than
thirty-seven percent minority residents. Id. at 977-78.
364
Id. at 978.
365 Id. at 979 (noting that the DHA selected the plaintiffs' neighborhood primarily
because it was more than sixty-three percent white).
366 Id.
367 Id.
363

368 Id. at 988. In the district court, a group of tenants in the public housing program
sought a declaratory judgment that the remedial orders were constitutional. Id. at 976. The
district court found for the tenants, but the Fifth Circuit reversed. Id. at 988. In a separate
action that was consolidated, residents sought a stay of construction. Id. The district court
entered judgment against the homeowners, but the Fifth Circuit enforced the stay. Id.
369 Id. at 978-81.
370 Id. at 979.
371 See id. at 980-81 ("In general, the racial classification of the homeowners is an injury
in and of itself."). The court in Walker V mentioned also that the homeowners alleged
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homeowners' sued for an injury grounded in their race as a shared
characteristic, as well as for any economic or aesthetic injury generated by
construction of the projects in their neighborhoods. 372
The Fifth Circuit ruled that because the remedial order required the siting of
the new public housing projects in predominantly white areas, the decision
amounted to a "racial classification" scheme to which strict scrutiny must
apply. 373 Like the courts in both MD/DC/DE Broadcasters and Eisenberg, the
Fifth Circuit did not discuss the nature or scope of the government's
compelling governmental interest in its strict scrutiny analysis. The plaintiffs
cleverly conceded that the remedial order was supported by the compelling
governmental interest of "remedy[ing] the vestiges of past discrimination and
segregation within Dallas's public housing programs." 374 Thus, the court
found it unnecessary to engage in any significant examination of the
underpinnings of that interest. 375 Instead, the court simply assumed that a
compelling governmental interest animated the remedial order, and proceeded
directly to the narrow tailoring inquiry. 376 Consequently, the narrow tailoring
discussion had an otherworldly quality, consisting of the court carefully
engaging in a five factor balancing test imported from the Supreme Court's
opinion in United States v. Paradise,3 77 but making little reference to the
governmental interest which the narrow tailoring analysis was intended to
modify.
The Fifth Circuit ruled that the remedial order was not narrowly tailored
because .a race-neutral remedy was available that could achieve the same
desegregation. 378 The narrow tailoring analysis was premised on the notion
that the construction of new public housing projects in predominantly white
areas was race-conscious, but that the provision of Section 8 housing
assistance with the express intent of moving minority families into privately
owned rental housing in predominantly white areas was actually racepotential loss of property value as well as other problems like crime and aesthetic value. Id.
at 980. The court added, "HUD and DHA cite no cases in which standing has been denied
to homeowners who asserted their quality of life and property values would be diminished
by a next-door public housing or other HUD project." Id.
372 See id. at 980-81.
373
Id. at 981 -82 ("Any race-conscious remedial measure receives strict scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause. This is true no matter which race is burdened or benefitted by
the racial classification in question." (citations omitted)).
374
See id. at 981-82.
375 Id. at 982.
376 Id.
377
480 U.S. 149 (1987). In Paradise, the court upheld a district court's order that
required the Alabama Department of Public Safety to promote one black officer for every
white officer promoted. Id. at 153. Applying strict scrutiny, a plurality of the Court
concluded that the order was narrowly tailored because there was no other viable option
available to the Court. Id. at 177.
378
Walker V, 169 F.3d at 982-88.
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neutral. 379 As Martha Mahoney has persuasively explained, it was bizarre to
label the provision of Section 8 certificates to minority tenants to desegregate
white areas as race-neutral, while at the same time characterizing the
construction of two forty-unit apartment complexes in white neighborhoods
race-conscious, and therefore ultimately unconstitutional. 380 Both modes of
remedial action sought exactly the same race-conscious end: the placement of
minority tenants in white neighborhoods. 381 Indeed, there is an argument that,
because both modes of remedy seek race-conscious ends, both are equally
unconstitutional. 382 But such an argument is inapplicable in a situation where
the court is evaluating an attempt to remedy invidious discrimination supported
by significant recalcitrance on the part of the responsible government entity.
In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit ignored questions raised about
the efficacy of Section 8 certificates for producing actual desegregation. The
district court had ruled that the provision of Section 8 certificates alone was not
an adequate remedy because reliance on the private market alone would not
disestablish the vestiges of the prior discrimination. 383 Thus, the district court
had determined that "Section 8 needed to be combined with new construction
or acquisition in predominantly white areas in order to remedy the effects of
past discrimination." 384 But from the Fifth Circuit's perspective, if Section 8
could somehow be shown to be an effective desegregation method, then there

379 Id. at 983-85 (calling Section 8 a "race-neutral measure" and indicating that it is
"superior to a race-conscious remedy in that it allows market forces and personal
preferences rather than racial criteria to guide the homemaking decision"). Section 8
housing vouchers provide housing assistance to eligible recipients so that they can secure
housing in the private rental market. See Federal Rental Assistance: Overview of the
Section 8 Program , 76 CONG. DIG. 229, 232 (1997).
380 Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy: Under-Ruling Civil Rights in Walker v.
City of Mesquite, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1309, 1351-52 (2000) (" Bizarrely, the Walker court
calls 'race neutral' a plan to give certificates to African Americans who were victims of
discrimination, even when it approves sending these tenants to 'nonblack' neighborhoods,
but it calls 'race-conscious' a plan to put two small apartment complexes into white
neighborhoods." (emphasis in original)).
38 1 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 977, 984-85 (discussing the goals of Section 8 and of the
district court' s remedial order).
382 See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative
Action, 88 GEO. L.J . 2331 , 2333 (2000) ("[S]trict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
is triggered by a law motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose, regardless of whether
the law employs an express racial classification or is race-neutral on its face. As the
Supreme Court's affirmative action cases establish, the purpose to benefit racial minorities
is a discriminatory purpose.").
383 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 983-85 (discussing the basis for the district court' s
remedial order).
384 See id. at 984; Mahoney, supra note 380, at 1347 ("Studies of Section 8 housing
around the United States published after the district court's remedial order show that,
without race-conscious intervention, Section 8 often fails to produce desegregation.").
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was no reason to trammel the alleged rights of third parties. 385 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit required that the race-neutral Section 8 program be used and clearly
found to fail prior to the institution of race-conscious public housing siting
decisions. 386 The district court's finding that if defendants did not "attach a
race-conscious site selection criterion to new construction, then the new units
[would] end up in minority areas," was rejected as "unfounded." 387
What Walker shares with MD/DC/DE Broadcasters and Eisenberg is the
brevity of the compelling governmental analysis in conjunction with a robust
narrow tailoring inquiry. But if there was any reason to jettison the compelling
governmental interest analysis in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters and Eisenberg,
there is even less of one in Walker. Both MD/DC/DE Broadcasters and
Eisenberg featured essentially voluntary actions on the part of governmental
actors to ameliorate or guard against discrimination in the private market,
while Walker featured a governmental actor who had to be dragged, "kicking
and screaming," to recognize its own complicity in racial discrimination.
3.

Walker v. City of Mesquite : Through the Lens of Intergroup
Competition for Housing Opportunities

What if the Fifth Circuit had analyzed the dispute from the standpoint of
intergroup competition for housing opportunities? The framework of the
analysis would have changed and a different outcome would have been
possible. As was the case in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters and Eisenberg, the
dispute in Walker conies down to this: may dominant players continue to enjoy
privileged access to opportunities and be allowed to "lock-out" other
competitors in the process? Viewing the dispute in Walker from this
perspective, how might this approach have changed the court's analysis?
The Walker court's lack of discussion of the nature of the compelling
governmental interest involved is deeply problematic. By assuming that the
defendants had a compelling governmental interest in remedying "the vestiges
of past discrimination and segregation within Dallas 's public housing
programs,"388 the court focused on the potential of the race-neutral Section 8
remedy without having to examine the scope and nature of the underlying
problem.
Instead, imagine if the court' s analysis had viewed the dispute from the
perspective of intergroup competition for housing opportunities and searched
for potential barriers to entry to the housing market. From this perspective, the
white homeowners in Walker were the beneficiaries of prior discriminatory
governmental regulation. The governmental defendants in Walker had used
385

See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 984-85 .
Id. at 985 ("When Section 8 has evidenced such promising results, options such as
these should be explored and tested before adopting a race-conscious remedy as a last
resort.").
387
Id. at 985.
388 Id. at 981.
386

1150

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1089

blatantly discriminatory means to create and maintain separate white and black
neighborhoods within the Dallas metropolitan area for several generations. 389
Until the remedial order at issue in Walker, the white homeowners had enjoyed
the benefits that came with living in a predominantly white neighborhood
without worrying about the pressures that could be created by minority
entrants.
While the plaintiffs were not necessarily acting with animus, it is also fair to
say that they were the beneficiaries of a previous government "charter" that
mandated racial segregation in Dallas metropolitan area neighborhoods and,
concomitantly, within the surrounding schools. One way of seeing Walker,
then, is as an attempt to preserve a built-in advantage that had been created by
prior discriminatory state action. That discriminatory state action had created a
tangible benefit by erecting a barrier of entry against rival racial and socially
defined groups in the same manner that a benefit is bestowed by governmental
regulation or licensing creating a regulatory monopoly. Prior governmental
action had acted as a barrier to entry to white neighborhoods and schools, and
the Walker plaintiffs successfully sought to maintain that barrier by urging the
judicial system to rule in their favor.
From this perspective, it would also be possible to see that the dispute in
Walker was necessarily linked to the interrelationship of race, housing, and
education. Many of the same themes animate both Walker and Eisenberg. For
instance, we know that a majority of whites are extremely hesitant to inhabit
neighborhoods with more than a token number of black residents.390 Thus,
white out-migration grows as the number of minority neighbors increases. 391
In addition, many white residents actively relocate to areas where white
residency is predominant in order to avoid integration. 392 Additionally, the
aversion to living in neighborhoods with black residents functions to maintain
a discriminatory housing market, as the real estate industry seeks to cater to the
"presumed values of customers. " 393
"White flight" has the effect of stripping whites from more racially diverse
neighborhoods and injecting them into areas already containing high

389

See Walker JJJ, 734 F. Supp 1289, 1293-1309 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (summarizing the
history of deliberate segregation in public housing in Dallas by the DHA).
39 Kyle Crowder, The Racial Context of White Mobility: An Individual-Leve/ Assessment
of the White Flight Hypothesis, 29 Soc. SCI. RES. 223, 244 (2000) ("[R]esearch consistently
shows that a majority of Whites prefer neighborhoods that are all-or nearly all-White and
are willing to tolerate only a very limited number of minority neighbors ... .").
391 Id. at 244-45.
392
See id. (stating that a majority of whites surveyed indicated that they would try to
move out ofa neighborhood in which they were outnumbered by minority residents).
393 See Reynolds Farley, Charlotte Steeh, Maria Krysan, Tara Jackson & Keith Reeves,
Stereotypes and Segregation: Neighborhoods in the Detroit Area, 100 AM. J. Soc.750, 776
(1994) (describing the perception of some whites that minorities invite filth and crime into
neighborhoods).

°
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concentrations of white residents. 394 This process merges groups of white
individuals, enhances their strength by concentrating resources, and creates a
defined political base: suburban communities. This movement facilitates both
control over and increased funding to local public schools. 395 Additionally,
there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between neighborhoods and
schools. Prospective residents seek access to certain neighborhoods because of
the quality of the surrounding schools; neighborhoods with good schools are
highly attractive, adding to the value of the homes within those
neighborhoods. 396 Indeed, there is little doubt that there is a strong relationship
between neighborhood quality and school quality. 397 So one way to view
Walker is as an attempt to erect barriers to entry to white neighborhoods in an
effort to "lock-up" the supply of these valuable benefits. From this
perspective, the plaintiffs in the case have chosen to "stand and fight" to
preserve neighborhood integrity against incursion from a rival racially,
socially, and economically defined group.
As has been discussed, current interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause
have thrown the constitutionality of affirmative action programs into grave
doubt. Indeed, this new skepticism of affirmative action has crept into the
evaluation of governmental decisionmaking with respect to race in areas that
do not necessarily implicate "classic" affirmative action problems. In the cases
we have examined, the courts have stringently applied the strict scrutiny
analysis to measures designed to redress past grievances. In doing so,
however, each of these courts failed to undertake a meaningful compelling
interest inquiry. Instead, the courts simply struck down the measures at issue
because they were not "narrowly tailored" to achieve a compelling
governmental interest-even though the courts had not fully explored what
those compelling interests might be. These holdings are symptomatic of an
approach that places stringent requirements on the government to first prove
that it (or a private actor it aided) caused the disparity its plan seeks to
ameliorate and then prove that the underlying race-based decision was truly
necessary to ameliorate that identified problem. The courts maintained that
affirmative action remedies are only justified when they are employed to
thwart current, overt acts of racism.
394

Crowder, supra note 390, at 223.
Rhodes Cook, Suburbia: Land of Varied Faces and a Growing Political Force, 55
CONG. Q. 1209, 1209 (1997) ("The power of the suburbs to tip both the presidential and the
congressional balance underscores the shape of American politics in the late 20th century.").
396 Ellen, supra note 152, at I 513- I 4 (indicating that many people desire good schools
and low crime and believe that the presence of minorities will decrease the quality of
schools and neighborhoods).
397 With few exceptions, suburban schools and schools with a larger percentage of white
students enjoy enhanced funding, better physical plants and higher levels of maintenance,
higher quality teachers, produce students who perform better on standardized tests, offer
advanced placement and other specialized courses, and provide havens from rather than
direct exposure to high levels of poverty and associated ills. powell, supra note 151, at 339.
395
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The more appropriate question was: what is the appropriate remedy for the
current effects of past discriminatory activity? As the previous discussion of
several recent cases demonstrated, the effects of prior racial discrimination are
still felt powerfully today because of "lock-in" effects in the areas of housing,
education and job opportunities. Thus, even if all decisionmakers today were
to act without regard to race, the effect would be to leave in place the
"distribution" scheme previously set up that was admittedly based on race.
At the same time, our discussion of social structural and social
psychological approaches to discrimination leads us to believe that, left alone,
members of socially and racially defined groups will act to exclude members
of other groups. 398 Members of groups often allocate resources to those within
their group and discriminate against outgroup members because to do so
contributes to their own individual self-conception. This suggests that the
levels of inequality among racial groups we currently observe can be expected
to be quite durable. The government should not be disabled from attempting to
correct for what are essentially the present effects of past discriminatory
conduct. Rather, governments ought to be permitted to take into account how
groups compete for resources. The courts, in applying significant constraints
on governmental actors attempting to correct such wrongs, have created a
regime which essentially says compliance with the Equal Protection Clause
requires that the governmental actor simply cease engaging in harmful
conduct, that it "sin no more." But once a defendant has been found to have
violated the Equal Protection Clause, that violation cannot be cured simply by
cessation of the harmful conduct.
IV. PLACING INTERGROUP COMPETITION AT THE CENTER OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. V. SLATER

In our survey of affirmative action cases in the "markets" of employment,
education and housing, we have seen how anticompetitive behavior has
allowed whites to lock-up access to benefits and opportunities. The courts
have largely failed to consider the competitive dynamics underlying these
cases, resulting in decisions that serve to maintain white competitive
advantage. However, there is one important exception, and it appears in the
Tenth Circuit's recent opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater
("Adarand VJl ") .399
The importance of the Tenth Circuit opinion lies in its explicit recognition
of the deeply anti-competitive nature of the construction industry. The Tenth
Circuit recognized that the inability to form relationships with powerful
incumbents and the lack of access to exclusive social contacts can frustrate the
ability of players to compete for bidding opportunities.400 The court
398
399

See supra Part II.

228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1170-71 (acknowledging "powerful" evidence that discrimination within and
throughout the construction industry has created a "decidedly uneven playing field for
400
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synthesized the behavior of white-dominated contractors, unions, and lending
companies. 401 The result, according to the court, is an anti-competitive force
that served to lock-in white advantage in that marketplace.402 This recognition
allowed the court to conclude that a compelling governmental interest
animated the affirmative action program at issue and that the program was
narrowly tailored to achieve the governmental interest, thus satisfying strict
scrutiny review. 403
A.

A (Very) Brief History of the Adarand Litigation

The development of the Adarand litigation from its inception through its
most recent sojourn to the United States Supreme Court has truly been a "long
and winding road." The importance of the litigation, culminating but certainly
not ceasing with the Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena4°4
is not to be underestimated. The Adarand litigation concerned several
provisions of the Small Business Act of 1958405 ("SBA") which presumed that
minority group members were socially and economically disadvantaged when
competing for federal contracting opportunities.406 The SBA set governmentwide participation goals in order to facilitate the award of federal contracts to
small businesses controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals and required heads of federal agencies to adopt agency-specific
goals for participation by disadvantaged businesses. 407 At the time, the Surface
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987408
("STURAA") provided that ten percent of all funds appropriated by the
Department of Transportation be awarded to businesses controlled by socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals. 409 This goal was enforced via a
contract term, the "subcontractor compensation clause," which paid a prime
contractor a financial bonus when a portion of the dollar amount of the contract
was expended on a disadvantaged business enterprise, or "DBE."410

minority subcontracting enterprises seeking to compete in the area of federal construction
subcontracts").
401
Id. at 1168-72 (noting that prime contractors and lenders act as "old boy" networks
and that unions "place before minority firms a plethora of barriers to membership").
402
Id. at 1168 (noting that the discriminatory practices of contractors, unions and lenders
"precludes from the outset [minority] competition for public construction contracts").
403
Id. at 1 I 87.
404
515 U.S. 200 (I 995) [hereinafter Adarand Ill] .
4o5 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-657e (2000).
406
Adarand Ill, 515 U.S. at 207.
407
Id. at 206 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(l)-(2) (2000)).
408
Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132 (1987) (prior to 1995 and 1998 amendments).
409
Adarand 111, 515 U.S. at 208 .
410
Id. at 208-10. In 1989, the Department of Transportation entered into a contract with
Mountain Gravel & Construction Co. ("Mountain Gravel") for the construction of a
highway in Colorado. Id. at 205 . According to the terms of the contract, Mountain Gravel
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. ("Adarand") complained that it had submitted
the low bid for the guardrail portion of a federal construction project funded
under the STURAA, yet it was not awarded the contract.411 Instead, the
contract was awarded to Gonzales Construction Company ("Gonzales"), a
minority-controlled company that had been certified as a DBE. 412 Adarand
argued that the government's use of the subcontractor compensation clause
denied it equal protection of the laws. 413 In Adarand III, the Supreme Court
held that all racial classifications, whether state or federal, must satisfy the
demands of strict scrutiny. 414 But because of the complexity of the regulatory
scheme involved, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts to determine
whether the subcontractor compensation clause at issue was narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 415
Subsequently, however, the Colorado Department of Transportation granted
Adarand DBE status, essentially providing it with the same preference that
Gonzales had enjoyed. 416 As a result, the Tenth Circuit ruled that Adarand's
cause of action was moot, and directed that the district court dismiss the
case. 417 In 2000, the Supreme Court issued its second ruling in the Adarand
litigation, and held that because Adarand's status as a DBE could be
invalidated by the Department of Transportation in the future, it was not
"absolutely clear that the litigant no longer had any need of the judicial
protection that it sought."41 8 Consequently, the Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit's decision, declaring that Adarand's "cause of action remains alive." 419
The issue on remand, however, was complicated by the fact that after
Adarand III, the federal government significantly changed the highway
would receive additional compensation for awarding subcontracts to DBE's. Id. at 209.
The Court dubbed this the "subcontractor compensation clause." Id. at 210.
411
Id. at 205 (noting that the Mountain Gravel's chief estimator submitted an affidavit
stating it would have awarded that subcontract to Adarand had it not been for the
subcontractor compensation clause).
41 2 Id.
413

Id. at 204, 212-13 . Because the government-actor was the federal government,
Adarand alleged that the contract was inconsistent with the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 204.
414 Id. at 227-29 (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990),
which applied an intermediate level of scrutiny for benign racial classifications adopted by
the federal government).
41 5 Id. at 237-39.
41 6
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999)
[hereinafter Adarand V] (noting that since Adarand now enjoyed the very preference it had ·
challenged, "it can no longer assert a cognizable constitutional injury").
4 17 Id. at 1297, 1299.
41 8 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 224 (2000) [hereinafter Adarand
VJ] .
41 9 Id. (holding that while the possibility of the harm may be too conjectural to confer
standing, it may not be so speculative as to render the case moot).
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construction contracting program in an effort to comply with the Supreme
Court's ruling. 420 While the preference for minorities and women was
continued, the changes made it more difficult for members of those groups to
qualify for preferential treatment. 421 For instance, the program incorporated a
net worth limit in order to maintain DBE status,422 required that "businesses
not exceed a certain amount of gross receipts in order to be eligible for the
DBE program,"423 and set a time limit for any particular company's
participation in the DBE program. 424 Program regulations also specifically
denounced the use of quotas and noted that the use of set-asides was prohibited
except "when no other method could be reasonably expected to redress
egregious instances of discrimination."425 Thus, in an effort to address the
"narrow tailoring" prong of the strict scrutiny test, racial preferences were seen
as a "last resort,"426 and the ten percent DBE participation goal was described
as "aspirational" rather than as compulsory. 427
The difficult challenge presented to the Tenth Circuit on remand was to
evaluate the program in both its pre- and post-1996 incarnations. 428
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit determined that the program as structured before
the relevant changes was unconstitutional as per Adarand III, but that the postchange program, which still incorporated racial classifications, withstood strict
scrutiny review. 429 The Supreme Court ultimately denied certiorari. 430

420
421
422

Adarand VII, 228 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000).
id. at I 191-95 (analyzing regulatory changes).

49 C.F.R. § 26.67(b)(l) (2001) (stating that if an individual owner of a firm has a
personal net worth in excess of $750,000, the presumption of economic disadvantage for
that firm is rebutted); see Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1193.
423
49 C.F.R. § 26.65(b) (2000); see Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1193.
424 15 U.S.C. § 636G)(IO)(C)(i) (2000); 13 C.F.R. § 124.2 (2000); see Adarand VII, 228
F.3dat 1193.
425 49 C.F.R. § 26.43(b) (2000); see Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1193.
426
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 707 (2d ed.
2002) (describing the Department of Transportation regulations implementing the
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century and suggesting that under the program,
"racial preferences will be used only on a showing of a substantial disparity in contracting in
particular areas and then only as a last resort upon a determination that race-neutral
alternatives are inadequate").
427
49 C.F.R. § 26.4l(b) (2000).
428
Adarand Vil, 228 F.3d at 1157-59. Because Adarand sought protective relief, the
court decided it was necessary to consider the intervening statutory and regulatory changes.
id. at 1158. However, in anticipation of potential future statutory and regulatory changes,
the court also decided to address the constitutionality of the previous scheme as well. id. at
1159.
429
id. at 1187 ("[A]fter examining the current [preference program], we conclude that
the 1996 defects have been remedied, and the relevant programs now meet the requirements
of narrow tailoring.").
430
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 102 (2001). Originally, the Court

1156

B.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1089

Through the Lens of Competition: Adarand v. Slater

The Tenth Circuit's decision is important because the court explicitly
recognized the competitive dynamics of the market at issue in the case, and
used the vocabulary of competitive analysis in its decision. At each step, this
context informed the court's analysis, making an enormous difference in both
the way it framed its inquiry and in the way it resolved the issues raised. The
Tenth Circuit opinion subjected the post-Adarand DBE program to strict
scrutiny review. 431 As usual, the first question was whether there was a
compelling governmental interest that might justify the use of race-conscious
measures. 432
Unlike the earlier cases we have analyzed, the Tenth Circuit began its
analysis by performing an in-depth evaluation of the "nature and the extent of
the evidence" that Congress had before it with respect to discrimination in the
construction industry. 433 The Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that mere
statements by members of Congress alleging discrimination in the construction
industry could support the finding of a compelling government interest. 434
Instead, the court asked whether there was a "strong basis in evidence to
support the legislature's conclusion. "435
Relying on Croson's "passive participant" language, the court probed
Congress's understanding of discrimination in the construction industry. 436
Here, the Tenth Circuit perceived two types of "discriminatory barriers to
minority subcontracting enterprises. "437 The first type of discriminatory
barrier prevented minority subcontracting companies from forming in the first
instance; these were essentially "creation barriers. "438 The second type of
discriminatory barrier was the "competition barriers" that impeded "fair
competition between minority and non-minority subcontracting enterprises."439
Both of these types of barriers to minority participation were supported by
disparity studies demonstrating that minority subcontractors have been under-

granted certiorari. 532 U.S. 967 (2001). Subsequently, however, Adarand indicated that it
did not wish to challenge the Tenth Circuit's determination on the DOT's state and local
procurement program and instead wished only to challenge the DOT's direct procurement
program. 534 U.S. at 103. Since the Tenth Circuit never addressed the direct procurement
program, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Id. at
111.
431 See Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1164-87 (applying the compelling interest and narrow
tailoring tests).
432 See id. at I I 64.
433 See id. at I 167 (emphasis in original).
434 id.
435 id.
436 Id.
437
438
439

id. at 1167-68.
id. at 1168.
id.
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utilized440 and evidence suggesting that there was a sharp reduction in minority
participation in federal contracting opportunities after the withdrawal of
affirmative action programs. 441
With respect to creation barriers, the court cited several congressional
studies which concluded that "discrimination by prime contractors, unions, and
lenders has woefully impeded the formation of qualified minority business
enterprises in the subcontracting market nationwide. "442 Discriminatory
conduct by these actors included the presence of "old boy" networks in the
family-dominated construction industry that refused to deal with minority
firms, white dominated subcontractors' unions that excluded minority firms,
and race-based denial of access to capital and lending opportunities by white
dominated financial institutions.443 Taken together, these various barriers to
entry prevented the creation of minority subcontracting enterprises that would
ultimately compete with white dominated firms. 444
On the competition barrier side, the court also pointed to myriad
Congressional studies that detailed the manner in which existing minority
firms were hampered in their ability to compete with established players in the
industry. For instance, the court noted that the government had presented
"powerful evidence" which suggested that:
[C]ontracting remains a closed network, with prime contractors
maintaining long-standing relationships with subcontractors with whom
they prefer to work. . Because minority owned firms are new entrants to
most markets, the existence and proliferation of these relationships locks

440

Id. at 1172-73.
Id. at 1174.
442 Id. at 1168.
443
Id. at 1168-70.
444 Indeed, this was precisely the point made by Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in
Adarand Ill. Justice Stevens explained the Congressional rationale which animated the
presumptions of social and economic disadvantage at issue:
I think it is particularly significant that the current program targets the negotiation of
subcontracts between private firms . . . . In this case, in contrast, the program seeks to
overcome barriers of prejudice between private parties-specifically, between general
contractors and subcontractors. The [statutes at issue] embody Congress' recognition
that such barriers may actually handicap minority firms seeking business as
subcontractors from established leaders in the industry that have a history of doing
business with their golfing partners. Indeed, minority subcontractors may face more
obstacles than direct, intentional racial prejudice: They may face particular barriers
simply because they are more likely to be new in the business and less likely to know
others in the business. Given such difficulties, Congress could reasonably find that a
minority subcontractor is less likely to receive favors from the entrenched
businesspersons who award subcontracts only to people with whom---or with whose
friends-they have an existing relationship. This program, then, if in part a remedy for
past discrimination, is most importantly a forward-looking response to practical
problems faced by minority subcontractors.
515 U.S. 200, 261-62 (1995).
441
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them out of subcontracting opportunities. As a result, minority-owned
firms are seldom or never invited to bid for subcontracts on projects that
do not contain affirmative action requirements. 445
Based upon the court's review of the evidence compiled by Congress, it
concluded that minority firms had been systematically excluded from the
ability to bid on construction projects, and that that systematic exclusion was a
result of more than just "outright racism. " 446
More importantly for our purposes, the court acknowledged that such
exclusion resulted from "insularity" and "informal, racially exclusionary
business networks."447 In this manner, minority firms were the quintessential
outsiders; they were on the outside of the inner workings of the established
construction industry which functioned to support, sustain and champion
insiders just as much as it discriminated against and excluded outsiders. 448
Disparity studies and the impact on minority firms after affirmative action
programs were removed also supported this conclusion. 449 Consequently, the
court found that the government's post-Adarand DBE program which included
a race-conscious remedy was justified by a compelling governmental
interest. 45 Finally, the Tenth Circuit also found that the DBE program was
narrowly tailored, particularly because the new program emphasized "the
continuing need to employ nonrace-conscious methods even as the need for
race 0 conscious remedies is recognized" and because there were appropriate
limitations on its duration. 451
The Tenth Circuit's willingness to recognize the existence and ramifications
of competition was a solid first step toward a more nuanced and more accurate
understanding of the intergroup conflict that is played out in affirmative action
cases. By analyzing the anticompetitive behaviors engaged in by white firms,
the court was able to recognize the structural problems created for black
competitors. As courts begin to engage in this type of inquiry, a deeper
understanding of competition will inform affirmative action cases. This shift
would go a long way toward structuring "rules of the game" that are truly fair
for all participants, regardless of race.

°

CONCLUSION

This Article explored the basic ideas of competition that underlie much of
American society. Social science theory informs how blacks and whites
445

Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1170 (citing Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in
Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042, 26,058 & nn.98-99 (1996) (Appendix: The
Compelling Interest for Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement)).
446
Id. at 1171.
441 Id.
448
See id.
449
Id. at 1172-75.
450 Id. at 1176.
451
Id. at 1179-80.
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engage in intergroup rivalry based on race. It then explores the process by
which that intergroup rivalry is acted out, particularly the anti-competitive
conduct in housing, education, and appointment. By combining these two
strands of thought, we see that whites, as a group, can act in ways analogous to
firms in a market, seeking to develop sustainable competitive advantage. The
Article then applied this thesis to affirmative action cases in employment,
education, and housing. In each area, it highlighted cases in which the courts
failed to recognize competitive dynamics, and failed to engage in a meaningful
compelling governmental interest analysis, resulting in erroneous conclusions.
The Article then highlighted the Tenth Circuit's decision in Adarand VII as
an example of a court properly recognizing competitive dynamics, resulting in
a fair outcome. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Adarand VII is important
because the court engaged in a meaningful compelling governmental interest
analysis. In so doing, the court took a hard look at the competitive dynamics
underlying the bidding for governmental contracts in the construction industry.
By analyzing the process by which minority contractors have been
systematically "locked out" of meaningful competition for bidding
opportunities, the court was able to develop a nuanced understanding of the
compelling governmental interest in the case. A nuanced and carefully
calibrated narrow tailoring analysis followed from that conclusion.
As more cases involving intergroup rivalry arise, courts need to understand
and consider the dynamics of competition and how it plays out in "markets"
such as education, employment, and housing. By adhering to outmoded,
cramped approaches to notions of discrimination that focus solely on animus or
racial "preferences," the courts are largely missing the point. Competitive
dynamics underlie many aspects of black-white intergroup relations. By
analyzing these dynamics, the courts will gain a powerful tool with which to
create richer jurisprudence in this area.

